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Abstract 
 
Steven McMullen: Two Essays on Students’ Homework Time in High School  
(Under the direction of Thomas Mroz) 
 
In the first essay I use nationally representative panel data on student behavior 
and academic performance to test two possible policy reforms.  First, I examine a policy 
that increases the amount of homework that students complete.  Second, I examine the 
impact of increasing the amount of homework assigned.  Previous studies have not been 
able to consistently estimate the impact of homework because of important omitted 
variables and measurement error, which strongly bias the estimated impact of homework 
time.  This paper, however, uses an instrumental variables approach with student fixed 
effects to account for both time-varying and time-invariant unobserved characteristics 
and inputs.  This approach produces estimates of the impact of homework time on 
academic achievement that are much larger than those of previous studies.  Also, when 
compared to popular policy changes such as decreasing class size or increasing teachers’ 
wages, a policy of assigning more homework is found to be the most cost effective policy 
tool.  Finally, these findings suggest that assigning additional homework primarily 
improves the achievement of low performing students and students in low performing 
schools.  Thus, assigning more homework could help close the gap in achievement 
between high and low performing students. 
  The second essay examines the extent to which high school students respond to 
education and labor market incentives when making decisions about homework, and 
 iv 
whether or not to drop out of high school.  Student and state fixed effects estimators as 
well as a discrete time hazard model are used to estimate these effects.  I find that 
students’ choices about homework and enrollment both respond to labor market 
incentives in similar ways.  Students are less likely to drop out of high school and 
complete more homework when more education-intensive industries are present in their 
state.  Higher unemployment rates are associated with lower dropout probabilities and a 
decrease in the amount of homework completed.  Finally, young women, low income 
students, and low achieving students increase their enrollment and homework time in 
response to a higher minimum wage. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 There has been considerable attention paid to the quality of secondary education 
in the United States since the Coleman report was published in 1966, highlighting the 
inequality of education achievement, especially between schools.  This attention has 
taken the form of political action and reform at the federal level, via the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act of 1965, Goals 2000 legislation (1994), and most recently, the 
No Child Left Behind Act (2002).  Each of these policies has attempted to address what 
has become the most important education policy challenge of this century: the stark gap 
in achievement that exists between the high and low achieving students in the US.  Much 
attention has been paid to the racial and socio-economic dimension of these achievement 
disparities.  African American and Hispanic students tend to perform well below 
comparable white and Asian students.  Moreover, low income students perform well 
below their high income peers. 
 Education reform has also been motivated by international achievement 
comparisons.  The Third International Math and Science Study which compared math 
and science performance by students across a number of countries found that US high 
school students ranked 28th and 17th in mathematics and science, respectively, out of 41 
countries (Aksoy and Link 2000).  This comparison also highlighted the gap in 
homework time between students in the US and elsewhere.  Among the 20 countries 
surveyed, in a ranking of average time spent on homework, the US tied for 18th place.  
Additionally, despite media reports to the contrary, the number of students spending less
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than an hour of homework per day has been increasing since 1984 (Brookings Institution 
2003) and currently more than two thirds of high school students are in this category.   
The policy response to these achievement problems has been varied.  Many 
aspects of the education system have been the target of reforms over the last 40 years 
including curriculum, class and school structure, teacher training and compensation, 
school financing, and school governance.  At the school level, with the advent of magnet 
and charter schools, experimentation has become commonplace.  While the evidence on 
charter schools overall is mixed, a few specific charter schools may have discovered a set 
of reforms that allow them increase student achievement where traditional public schools 
have not been able to.   
 One such school model is worth highlighting.  The KIPP (Knowledge is Power 
Program) schools, and others such as Roxbury Prep (Massachusetts) have made 
increasing homework demands on their students a central element of their reforms.  Each 
school assigns around two hours of homework to each student per night, and each school 
has some disciplinary policy in place to motivate students to complete all of their 
homework.  At risk students in these schools have shown much higher improvement in 
standardized exams than have their peers in neighboring public schools.   
There is however, still debate about the source of these schools’ successes (EPI 
2005).  Because these schools may have a favorably selected sample of students, their 
success is not necessarily evidence that this schooling model is superior, and without data 
from the schools, that question can not be answered directly.  What can be investigated, 
and is in the second chapter of this dissertation, is whether a policy of increasing the 
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amount of homework that students complete would significantly increase their academic 
achievement. 
 This study falls within a strong body of work by many scholars who have 
attempted to evaluate school reforms, and have greatly advanced our knowledge 
regarding school effectiveness.  Unfortunately, the largest determinants of student 
success are often the characteristics that are difficult, expensive, or impossible to 
manipulate.  For example, there is now a consensus that reducing class size has a positive 
effect on student achievement, especially in early grades.  Unfortunately, the impact is 
often too small and the change too expensive for this to be a main component of a 
solution to the achievement problem (Hanushek 1998).   
 As a contribution to this field, this dissertation presents evidence, in the second 
chapter, that the amount of time that students spend doing mathematics homework is a 
very strong determinant of their achievement on a standardized mathematics test.  An 
additional hour of mathematics homework per week over the course of a school year is 
estimated to increase their achievement, relative to their peers, by 8 to 9 percentile points. 
Thus it is likely that policies which increase the amount of homework that students 
complete will be quite successful at improving achievement.  While other researchers 
have found that homework time has a positive effect on student achievement, this uses an 
approach which is better able to take into account the differences, often unobservable, 
between students that can make comparisons difficult.  This method, which uses 
individual fixed effect models with instrumental variables to control for individual and 
school level heterogeneity, produces estimates of the impact of homework time that are 
much larger than other studies have produced. 
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 One obvious policy to increase homework time is simply to have teachers assign 
additional homework.  Even though assigning homework only results in a fraction of 
students actually completing much additional homework, the impact is fairly strong.  
When compared from a cost-effectiveness standpoint with other reforms – increasing 
teachers’ salaries and decreasing class size – assigning additional homework is found to 
increase achievement far more than these other policies for the resources invested.   
 Moreover, the students whose mathematics test scores improve the most as a 
result of either completing more homework or being assigned more homework are those 
students who are low-performing in 8th grade, or those who attend relatively low-
performing schools.  In fact, assigning additional homework is more likely to induce 
these at-risk students to complete more homework than the high-performing students or 
those in high-performing schools.  This suggests that schooling policies which increase 
the homework demands on students may be one way to improve the performance of at-
risk students, and decrease the achievement gap. 
While the second chapter documents that the amount of homework students 
complete is a strong determinant of academic success, it leaves relatively unexplored 
students’ reasons for spending time on homework.  The third chapter aims to help build a 
successful homework policy reform by exploring the factors that motivate students to 
invest their time on schoolwork.  As a starting point for this analysis, this chapter 
proposes a model of student behavior in high school that takes into account student’s 
expectations about future college and employment choices and opportunities.  The main 
contribution of this section is the prediction that students’ will respond to current and 
future expected labor market opportunities by completing more or less homework.   
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In the empirical section of this chapter, the impact of various labor market 
conditions on the amount of homework students complete is compared to the impact of 
these conditions on the probability of dropping out of school.  Unlike the determinants of 
homework time, factors which contribute to a higher dropout rate are well-documented in 
the literature, and therefore make a good point of comparison.  Overall, there are some 
similarities between students’ responses in terms of homework and dropout probabilities.  
Young women, low income students and low achieving students complete more 
homework and are less likely to drop out of school in response to a higher minimum 
wage.  Similarly, all students, though women especially, are more likely to complete high 
school and do more homework in response to growth in education-intensive industries.  
Finally, higher unemployment rates are associated with fewer students dropping out and 
decreases in homework time, with the strongest effects among young men.    
 While these effects are not large enough to predict large changes in academic 
achievement over the course of the business cycle, they do provide some framework for 
understanding the documented correlation between SAT test scores and education wage 
premium (Bishop 1991).  These results also establish that students respond to labor 
market incentives when they are making choices about homework, which is consistent 
with forward looking rational behavior.  If this is the case, a homework policy that 
establishes stronger incentives to complete homework, in conjunction with increased 
homework assignments, could be very effective. 
 Being limited to the questions available in the National Education Longitudinal 
Study of 1988, this work can not address some of the obvious questions that arise 
concerning the type of homework assigned, the way in which the homework is 
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completed, or the attention paid to the homework by the instructors.  Nevertheless, these 
findings indicate that current homework practices are highly effective, and successful 
innovations regarding the type of homework assigned would likely only improve these 
strong results. 
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Chapter 2: Impact of Homework Time on Academic Achievement 
I. Introduction 
 The amount of homework that students should complete has been an issue of 
debate and scholarship for decades.  Some schools, such as the KIPP (Knowledge Is 
Power Program) schools have demonstrated much higher than normal achievement 
growth, often among at-risk populations (AEI 2005), by assigning more homework than 
other public schools1 and implementing strict homework completion policies.2  Scholars 
disagree however, about whether their success is due primarily to a superior schooling 
model or to favorable student selection (Rothstein et al. 2005).  The academic literature 
pertaining to these reforms, despite much research on the topic, is not conclusive.  
Previous studies have done little to correct for the biases caused by omitted variables that 
likely influence students’ choices regarding study time.3 
 In this paper, I examine two related issues.  The first is the effect of students’ time 
spent doing homework on achievement test scores.  The second is the impact of assigning 
                                                 
1 Assigning homework seems to be less and less popular.  The Brookings Institution press release (2003) 
writes that “Since 2001, feature stories about onerous homework loads and parents fighting back have 
appeared in Time, Newsweek, and People magazines; the New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles 
Times, Raleigh News and Observer, and the Tampa Tribune; and the CBS Evening News and other media 
outlets.”  Their research indicates that the homework load for most US students is actually quite low.  
 
2 Other successful charter schools have implemented similar reforms, such as Roxbury Prep School in 
Boston, MA. 
 
3 Recent work done by economists such as Aksoy and Link (2000), and Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner 
(2007) have made progress, but their approaches can only address a subset of the endogeneity problems 
involved with measuring this effect.  The difference between their results and those of previous scholars 
(Cooper et al 1998) indicates that the endogeneity problems result in large biases. 
  
additional homework on achievement.  By testing the impact of these policies using 
nationally representative data, this study avoids the sample selection problems that 
accompany comparisons of charter school students’ test scores with those of their peers.  
The primary econometric challenge that this study overcomes is that there are likely a 
host of unobserved variables, such as student ability, that influence both how much time a 
student spends on homework and the students’ achievement test scores.  By combining 
instrumental variables estimation with an individual-fixed-effects specification, I control 
for both unobserved heterogeneity that is constant over time and time-varying 
heterogeneity that might influence the amount of time students spend on homework.  This 
approach yields estimates of the impact of homework that are much larger than those of 
previous studies.  The presence of time-varying unobserved factors is especially 
important to consider when estimating the impact of education inputs that are under the 
students’ control, since students can respond in each period to changing incentives.   
I find that one extra hour of mathematics homework per week improves 
mathematics achievement by 0.243 standard deviations4.  This change is large enough to 
move a student from the 50th percentile of math achievement to the 59th percentile5 over 
the course of a school year.  Additionally, this effect varies based on student 
characteristics and institutional factors.  I find evidence that low achieving students and 
those in lower-performing schools realize much higher returns to their homework time 
than other students.  Likewise, a policy of assigning more homework disproportionately 
                                                 
4 The impact is reported here in terms of the standard deviation of the mathematics achievement test score 
used as the measure of academic achievement in this study.  The sample used for this study is nationally 
representative, and thus the impacts can be interpreted as increases in achievement relative to the 
performance of similar students in the US. 
 
5 The impacts are relative to students who do not increase their homework time. 
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benefits these students.  These findings lead to two important conclusions.  First, it is 
possible for students to overcome past poor performance or a low quality school by 
spending more time doing homework.  Second, a policy that increases the amount of 
homework assigned is likely to reduce the gap between low and high achieving students.  
 Finally, in order to compare policy instruments, I estimate the cost-effectiveness 
of increasing student achievement for each of the following changes: assigning more 
homework, decreasing class size, and increasing teachers’ salaries.  For a given monetary 
investment, increasing the amount of assigned homework improves achievement 3.5 
times as much as increasing teachers’ wages, and 11 times as much as decreasing class 
size. 
 
II. Background  
 Previous studies within the education production function literature have 
documented a number of inputs that have an impact on students’ academic achievement.  
These include school funding (Altonji and Dunn 1996), class size,6 teacher characteristics 
and training (Hanushek, et al 1998; Hanushek and Rivkin 2007), the amount of time 
spent in class or in school (Aksoy and Link 2000), and the performance of a student’s 
peers (Sacerdote 2001;  Zimmerman 2003; Hanushek and Rivkin 2006).  Certain 
characteristics of the student and their family also are important, including parents’ 
permanent income (Blau 1999; Dahl and Lochner 2005) as well as the student’s race and 
sex. 
                                                 
6 Decreasing class size has a small impact, with the most benefit in early grades.  For a review of the class 
size literature, see Hanushek (1998). 
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The focus of this study is on another input: student time spent on homework.  The 
theoretic literature predicts a positive impact of homework time on academic 
achievement (Betts 1996; Neilson 2005).  Almost all of the empirical studies on this topic 
find evidence that homework time has a positive impact on academic achievement, 
although there is no consensus on the magnitude of the impact.  The literature pertaining 
to this topic will be presented in two sections: first, a review of literature from outside the 
economics discipline and second, a review of recent work done by applied economists.     
 Within the fields of education, psychology, and sociology there has been much 
research on the impact of homework.  Cooper et al. (2006) provides a good review of 
recent work in these fields.  All of the published studies that Cooper et al. review that use 
multivariate regression analysis find similar results: increased homework causes a small 
increase in academic achievement.  These studies, however, are limited to cross section 
analysis and do not try to take into account omitted inputs or characteristics.  Shuman et 
al. (1985), Hill (1991), and Rau and Durand (2000) all find similar results when trying to 
document the impact of homework time on the performance of college students.  Each 
study either finds the relationship hard to document or finds a small effect of homework 
time on college grades. 
Applied economists have only recently started to pay attention to the impact of 
homework time on achievement, starting with Julian Betts’ 1996 analysis of the 
Longitudinal Study of American Youth.  Since then Aksoy and Link (2000), Eren and 
Henderson (2007), and Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2007) have all examined this 
question.  Each of these studies makes a serious attempt to address unobserved inputs.  
Eren and Henderson, in the parametric portion of their paper, use a value added 
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specification,7 both Betts and Aksoy and Link use a specification with student fixed 
effects, and Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner use the students’ roommate’s videogame 
ownership as an instrument, estimating the effect with two stage least squares.   
  This study improves the estimation of the effect of homework on academic 
achievement in three ways.  First, the primary shortcoming in this literature is that 
previous work fails to adequately account for unobserved inputs that influence both 
academic achievement and the amount of time spent on homework.  None of these 
studies, with the exception of Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner8 can account for 
unobserved influences that vary over time.  To address this potential problem I use the 
amount of assigned homework and the student’s locus of control9 as instruments for 
student homework time, as well as a student fixed effects.  Dealing with the endogeneity 
of students’ homework time in this manner greatly influences the estimated effects.  
Second, previous research has documented that the return to homework time varies based 
on a student’s ability (Eren and Henderson 2007).  In this study, I document that the 
return to homework also varies with school quality.  Finally, this paper documents that a 
policy of increasing the amount of homework assigned to students is a cost-effective 
alternative to traditional policy interventions, and that this policy would 
disproportionately aid low-performing students and those in low-performing schools. 
 
                                                 
7 The value added specification is a cross section regression with a lagged test score (or other dependent 
variable) included on the right hand side of the equation to control for past achievement, inputs, and student 
characteristics.  For more detail and a specification comparison, see appendix D. 
8 Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2007) does a good job documenting the relationship between homework 
and achievement, but does so within a selected non-representative college age population.  Their 
instrumental variable strategy, however, is not reproducible on a large scale. 
 
9 The locus of control measures the extent to which a student believes that she can influence her own future 
outcomes.  For a detailed description, see appendix A. 
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III. A Model of Homework Time Allocation and Academic Achievement 
 This section presents a standard model of homework demand in the context of an 
education production function.  This framework will be used in the next section to 
motivate an econometric strategy.  The utility of student i at time t depends on leisure 
time (Di-Hit), future expected wages (Wi), grades (Git), and individual preferences (
P
itX ), 
where Di is the disposable time available to the student to allocate between homework 
time (Hit) and leisure.  Students choose the amount of homework to complete that 
maximizes their utility. 
 (1) ,( , , )
P
it i it i it itU u D H W G X= −  
 The students’ human capital (Eit) is also a function human capital investments 
prior to 8th grade (Pi), innate ability (Ai), school and district inputs (Sit), teacher inputs 
(Tit), individual characteristics (
C
itX ), work experience (Exit), and a shock ( itυ ) that might 
include an external event (illness, divorce) or the chance of getting placed in a class 
which proves exceptionally difficult or easy for other reasons.   
(2) ( ), , , , , , ,Cit it i i it it it it itE f H A P S T X Ex υ=  
This education production function will dictate the return (in terms of academic 
achievement) of an hour of homework, which can vary by student ability, school quality, 
and other characteristics.  Grades are a function of student’s human capital, the amount of 
homework assigned (Hait), and the amount of homework completed (Hit). 
(3) ( ), ,it it it itG g E H Ha=  
Education, and thus homework, pays off by increasing expected future wages, which are 
rewarded at rate p which is the market price of human capital. 
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(4) i itW pE=  
A student’s demand for homework will depend on the elements of her utility 
function, the determinants of her future expected income, and the inputs into the 
education production function. 
(4) * ( , , , , , , , , , )P Cit i i it it it it it it itH h A P S T p Ha X X Ex υ=  
Even within a class students will vary in the amount of homework that they do because  
they differ in levels of ability, levels of past achievement, preferences, and because they 
realize different shocks to their education which may induce them to study more or less 
often.   
 
IV. Empirical Approach 
 Using a framework based on the theoretical model, this section explains the 
challenge of identifying the parameters of the education production function (equation 2), 
and presents an econometric approach for overcoming these challenges.10  The simplest 
approach would be to estimate the following linear econometric model:  
(5) 0 1 2 3 4it it it it it i itAT H S T Xα α α α α λ ε= + + + + + +  
where ATit is an achievement test score, which serves as a measure of human capital, the 
alpha parameters represent the impact of the inputs on academic achievement, iλ  is an 
error term that is constant over time, and itε  is a time-varying error term.  The error term 
iλ  will include two unobserved determinants of a student’s human capital: student ability 
(Ai) and education inputs up until the start of grade 8 (Pi).  The time varying error term 
                                                 
10 For a more general discussion of the identification of education production function parameters see Todd 
and Wolpin 2003. 
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( itε ) will include the unobserved education shock ( itυ ).  Estimating this model may 
produce biased estimates of the impact of homework (the parameter 1α ) for three 
reasons:  
1. The input Hit is partially determined by the student ability (Ai) and previous 
human capital investments (Pi), which also impact the students’ achievement.  
These inputs are unobserved, however, and their impact on student study time is 
uncertain.  
2. The unobserved human capital shock itυ  likely biases the parameter estimate 
downward, since a negative shock to a students’ education would likely both 
decrease the amount the student learns in the year and increase the amount of time 
spent on homework (Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner 2007).11   
3. The amount of homework that students complete is measured with some error.  
This variable is recorded categorically, and the questions and categories change 
slightly across waves.  Measurement error of this type is likely to bias the 
estimates downward.12 
Because the magnitude of these impacts is unknown, and there are possible biases in each 
direction, it is unclear whether the OLS cross section estimates will be biased upward or 
downward. 
                                                 
11 For example, if a student became seriously ill for one semester, their test scores would likely suffer, but 
at the same time, they might increase the amount of time spent on homework in an attempt to make up for 
missed school.  This would create a spurious negative correlation between homework time and test scores.  
A similar process may be likely for other types of shocks to a students’ education, such as an poor teacher-
student match.  For a larger discussion of this effect, see Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner 2007. 
 
12 If the effect of the coding is to, on average, under-report the amount of homework done, then it is 
possible that the homework parameter would be biased upward as a result of this measurement error.  In the 
more likely case that the reporting error is symmetric or close to symmetric around the true value, then the 
bias will be downward. 
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 One method for addressing these identification problems is the use of 
instrumental variables estimation.  The required instruments must affect student 
homework and be uncorrelated with the omitted variables.  Using these variables to 
instrument for homework time isolates variation in the homework variable that is not 
correlated with the omitted variables.  Estimating the effect of this exogenous variation in 
homework on achievement gives a consistent estimate of the impact of homework.   
Using the two stage least squares estimation method, the first stage equation is 
estimated as in equation (6): 
(6) 0 1 2 3 4 5it it it it it it i itH Z S T X Lβ β β β β β φ ϕ= + + + + + + +  
In this specification Zit is the set of instruments.  Also the school inputs, teacher inputs 
and observed student characteristics are assumed to be exogenously determined.  The 
second stage equation is the education production function as shown in equation (7), 
which includes the amount of homework predicted by the estimation of equation (6) 
( ˆ itH ) instead of the observed homework amount (Hit). 
(7) 0 1 2 3 4
ˆ
it it it it it i itAT H S T Xα α α α α λ ε= + + + + + +  
The omitted ability, past inputs, and education shock variables (Ai, Pi, itυ ) are still 
present in the error terms in equation (7), but they will not be correlated with the 
predicted homework variable ( ˆ itH ).  
 The instrumental variables approach may not produce a consistent estimate of the 
impact of homework if there are endogenous variables other than the homework variable.  
If the omitted variables are also correlated with the other inputs in the education 
production function, then including these other inputs can bias the estimate of the effect 
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of homework ( 1α ).  A fixed effects estimator (or within estimator) can be useful for 
eliminating certain types of omitted variables problems.  If an individual fixed effect is 
included, this will absorb the time-invariant individual specific error term iλ .     
 This will eliminate bias caused by omitted variables under certain conditions.  
First, the omitted variables must not change over time.  Second, the relationship between 
the omitted variables and achievement must be linear.  Third, inputs in the education 
production function may be correlated with the time invariant error term ( iλ ) but not with 
the time varying error.  Thus even if there are multiple endogenous inputs in the 
education production function, the bias from time-invariant omitted variables, such as 
student ability (Ai) and education investments from before 8
th grade (Pi), will be 
eliminated.  Moreover, if the other inputs, such as teacher experience, certification, 
wages, or class size, are selected by students and parents, this selection is likely based on 
permanent student characteristics.  As such, any bias caused by self selection is likely 
eliminated by using student fixed effects. 
 The fixed effects estimation will likely produce estimates of the impact of 
homework ( 1α ) that are biased downward, for two reasons.  First, the time varying 
omitted shock itυ  may be correlated with the transitory portion of the homework and test 
score variables.  If this is the case, the fixed effects will magnify the impact of transitory 
changes in homework due to this shock.  Second, the measurement error will now 
account for an even larger portion of the variation left in the observed amount of 
homework.  This means that the bias caused by measurement error will be more serious 
in a fixed-effects specification than in the first specification (equation 5). 
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 In order to address these problems, I use instrumental variables to estimate a 
specification that includes student fixed effects.  To do so, a student fixed effect is 
included in both the first and second stage equations.  This somewhat eases the task of 
finding valid instruments, since instruments need to be uncorrelated with the time-
varying error term, but may be correlated with the time-invariant error term. 
 
Instruments 
The two variables used in this study as instruments are the amount of homework 
assigned by the student’s teacher and the student’s measured locus of control.  The 
amount of homework assigned by the student’s instructor is unlikely to have any direct 
causal impact on test scores, apart from the effect on the amount of homework 
completed.  This variable may reflect the ability and motivation of the students, however, 
if teachers assign more homework to classes with gifted or more motivated students, such 
as advanced placement or honors courses.  Thus this variable may not be a valid 
instrument, except when student fixed effects are included in the first stage regression.  
The fixed effects will control for any selection based on time-invariant characteristics, 
such as student ability.  The exogeneity of the instruments is tested in section six.  
 The second variable that is used to predict students’ homework is the locus of 
control.  This variable measures the degree to which a student believes that she can 
impact her own future, and varies greatly within students over time.  A student with an 
internal locus is more likely to believe that her future depends on choices that she makes, 
while a student with an external locus is more likely to believe that external forces will 
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dictate the events of her life.13  Previous studies have found that a strong internal locus of 
control is associated with positive outcomes in situations that require independent 
decision-making, such as positive health behaviors (Steptoe and Wardle 2001), lower 
dropout rates in distance education (Parker 1999) and success in web-based coursework 
(Wang and Newlin 2000).  Students with an internal locus, on average, spend more time 
doing homework, since they are more likely to expect the time investment today to pay 
off in the future.  It may not be immediately obvious that the student’s locus of control 
will be unrelated to their academic performance except through homework.  It is 
reasonable to assume, however that variations in this variable do not impact a student’s 
ability to answer mathematical questions correctly.  I will show that the students’ locus of 
control does predict the amount of time spent on homework, and does not, in a fixed 
effects specification, separately predict achievement test scores. 
 
V. Data 
 The primary data used for the empirical work come from the National Education 
Longitudinal Study of 1988, a nationally representative longitudinal survey of students 
who were in the 8th grade in 1988.  Follow up surveys were given in 1990 and 1992, with 
teacher and school counselor surveys in each wave, and parent surveys in the first and 
third waves.  With each survey the students were given achievement exams in 
mathematics, science, English, and history.  The exams are designed to allow comparison 
across waves, and to accurately test students at different achievement levels, and are 
reported as a standardized variable with a t-distribution, with mean 5 and a standard  
                                                 
13 The locus of control used here is a combination of students’ answers to three standard questions which 
ask the student things which might influence their future.  For a detailed description of the construction of 
the locus of control variable, see appendix A. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Hours of Mathematics Homework per Week 1.46 1.68 5.31 4.74 5.76 4.27 
Hours of Assigned Homework per Week14 2.23 0.95 3.21 1.79 2.88 1.41 
Mathematics Test Score 4.68 0.83 5.21 0.95 5.87 0.96 
Class Size (in units of 10 students) 2.41 0.51 2.35 0.55 2.78 1.66 
Teachers are Certified in Subject Matter 0.82 0.37 0.99 0.08 0.99 0.10 
Inexperienced Teachers 0.10 0.22 0.11 0.22 0.07 0.25 
Minimum Annual Teacher Wage 28.48 5.18 29.40 5.60 30.92 6.64 
Locus of Control 0.09 0.58 0.06 0.61 0.14 0.62 
Average Peers' Test Score 5.34 0.52 5.49 0.68 5.65 0.73 
Average Peers' HW Time on all subjects 5.43 1.72 7.46 2.29 13.14 3.37 
State Unemployment Rate 5.70 1.54 5.60 0.98 7.22 1.41 
Minimum Wage 3.37 0.07 3.50 0.29 4.27 0.08 
Industry Mix 8.05 0.16 8.08 0.17 8.09 0.16 
State Public four year tuition 1.61 0.53 1.92 0.67 2.43 0.82 
State Financial Aid Per Student 0.33 0.27 0.36 0.28 0.46 0.39 
State Higher Ed. Appropriations Per Student 6.39 1.88 6.90 2.05 6.74 1.64 
Number of Students 7450   6402   3758   
This Data is from the National Education Longitudinal Study of 1988.  Wave 1 corresponds to students in 
the 8th grade, wave 2 to the 10th grade, and wave 3 to the 12th grade.  The summary statistics for this 
sample do not differ substantially from the complete sample of collected data.  All monetary variables are 
measured in thousands of dollars, and inflation adjusted to 2005 dollars. 
 
deviation of 1.  Of the 17,580 students who have at least two recorded mathematics exam 
scores, 2295 students were not included in the sample used here because they did not 
respond to the questions about homework time or locus of control.  Moreover, 5928 
students were not included because the students’ teachers did not respond to questions 
about their class size, experience or assigned homework, and 1455 were not included 
because of missing data on teachers’ wages or the student’s peers’ behavior.  The 
resulting sample includes 17610 observations on 7902 students.  The characteristics of 
these students do seem to differ from the general sample on many key variables, both  
 
                                                 
14 The amount of homework assigned per week is a classroom level variable, not student.  It is computed as 
an average of the observed teachers’ responses. 
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Table 2: Education Production Function Estimation Results 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Estimation Method OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
0.036 0.839 0.006 0.221 0.222 0.244 0.243 
Hours of Math Homework per Week 
(0.002) (0.084) (0.001) (0.072) (0.074) (0.087) (0.086) 
-0.028 -0.015 -0.010 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.004 
Class Size (in units of 10 students) 
(0.008) (0.029) (0.004) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
0.126 -0.070 -0.011 -0.014 -0.014 -0.002 -0.001 
Certified Teacher 
(0.026) (0.057) (0.014) (0.034) (0.034) (0.037) (0.037) 
-0.237 0.091 -0.016 0.090 0.099 0.108 0.106 
Inexperienced Teacher 
(0.029) (0.102) (0.015) (0.051) (0.052) (0.059) (0.058) 
0.006 0.025 0.003 0.009 0.007 0.005 0.004 Minimum Annual Teacher Pay (in 
thousands) (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Student Fixed Effects no no yes yes yes yes Yes 
Peer Characteristics no no no no yes yes Yes 
Labor Market Characteristics no no no no no yes Yes 
Higher Edu. Market Characteristics no no no no no no Yes 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses.  The dependent variable for each regression is the 
mathematics achievement test score.  All regressions include wave indicators.  The sample includes 
17610 observations on 7902 students.  Columns one and two are pooled regressions with the standard 
errors clustered at the level of the individual.  The first stage regressions are shown in Table 3. 
because of non-random attrition and non-random survey non-response.15  Summary 
statistics of the variables used in this paper are shown in Table 1.  In addition to the 
NELS data, data on state minimum wage laws from the Department of Labor are added, 
as are industry mix data from the 1988, 1990, and 1992 IPUMS Current Population 
Survey March supplement (King et al. 2008).  The state level unemployment rate data 
came from Bureau of Labor Statistics.  These data sets are used to create the labor market 
variables, which are merged with the NELS by the students’ state of residence.  Finally, 
the higher education variables come from the Almanac of Higher Education (Chronicle of 
Higher Education 1989, 1991, 1993).  For variable definitions, see appendix A. 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
15 See appendix F for an analysis of the attrition problem and sample comparisons. 
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VI. Results 
 This section first summarizes the estimates of the education production function.  
Second, it examines the validity of the instrumental variables, and finally it compares the 
impact of various education policies. 
 
The Impact of Mathematics Homework on Mathematics Achievement  
Table 2 displays estimates from each of estimation techniques and specifications 
described in the previous section.16  Each specification includes wave indicator variables, 
the average observed class size and three indicators of teacher quality: whether the 
student’s teachers are certified in their subject, an indicator that the teacher has less than 
4 years of experience, and the minimum teacher pay in the student’s school.17  
The ordinary least squares estimate of the impact of an hour of mathematics 
homework per week, shown in column one, is a 0.036 standard deviation increase in the 
student’s mathematics test score, which corresponds to an improvement of about 1.5 
percentile points.18  This estimate may be biased if the students’ unobserved prior 
education inputs or innate abilities influence the amount of time spent on homework.  
Column two shows the two stage least squares estimates of the same specification.  The 
amount of homework assigned and the student’s locus of control are used as instruments 
excluded from the second stage to identify the amount of homework that students 
complete.  The instrumental variables estimate is twenty-three times higher that the 
                                                 
16 For the full results for the main specifications, see appendix B. 
 
17 For a comparison to the “value added” specification, see appendix D.  For an discussion of the problem 
of the left-censored independent variable, see appendix F. 
 
18 Starting from the 50th percentile in Mathematics test scores within the sample. 
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estimate from column one, at 0.839 achievement test standard deviations, or an 
improvement of 29 percentile points for each hour of homework.  This estimate is likely 
much higher for three reasons.  First, it corrects for the downward bias due to 
measurement error.  Second, it corrects for the downward bias documented by 
Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2007) that results from students responding to education 
shocks.  Third, the two stage least squares estimate could be biased upward if students 
with greater motivation or intelligence select more difficult courses that include more 
assigned homework, since the amount of homework assigned is being used as an 
instrument.  I test the validity of the instruments later, and find that in this specification, 
the estimate of the impact of homework is likely biased upward due to selection of this 
type. 
The instrumental variables estimate may also be biased if students select other 
inputs based on unobservable characteristics.  For example, parents of more able children 
may select better school districts with smaller class sizes and more qualified teachers.  If 
this is the case, the other endogenous inputs can bias the estimate of the impact of an 
extra hour of homework. 
 In order to control for these selection issues, a fixed effects specification is 
employed.  If the selection is based on student characteristics that do not change over 
time, then the student-fixed effects estimate will eliminate the bias not only in the impact 
of hours of homework, but also in the other inputs.  This estimator will also control for 
the linear effects of any differences in past inputs that are not included in these 
specifications.   The third column in Table 2 shows the estimates of the same 
specification as the one shown in the first column, but with student fixed effects included.  
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These estimates are much smaller.  The impact of an hour of homework with student 
fixed effects is 1/6th the size of the OLS estimates presented in the first column.   
The problems with the fixed effects estimates can be addressed by using 
instrumental variables in addition to the student fixed effects.  The fourth column in 
Table 2 shows the results of the student fixed effects specification estimated using two-
stage least squares, where the excluded instruments are again the amount of homework 
assigned by the student’s teachers and the student’s locus of control.  This estimate, while 
less precisely estimated than the fixed-effects estimate, is much higher, and gives a 
quantitatively and qualitatively different result.  A student who completes an extra hour 
of homework each week is estimated to improve her mathematics test score by 0.22 
standard deviations, an improvement of 8 percentile points for each hour studied.  A 
standard deviation increase in mathematics homework time, roughly 4 hours per week, 
would increase the student’s mathematics test score by 30 percentile points.  Even if we 
accept the lower bound of the 95% confidence interval for this estimate, which is 0.079 
standard deviations, the return to homework is still 13 times higher than the fixed effects 
estimate.  This lower bound estimate indicates that an hour of homework per week would 
move a student from the 50th percentile to the 53rd percentile in mathematics 
achievement. 
If the instruments provide exogenous variation in student homework time, the 
estimates in the fourth column should not change substantially when other inputs are 
included in the specification.  Columns five through seven test this by adding a series of 
other factors which might influence homework time.  In each case the estimate of the 
return to homework changes only a small amount. 
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 First, in order to control for other school-wide inputs and peer group influences, 
the specification shown in column five includes the average amount of homework done 
by the students’ peers,19 and the average mathematics test score of the student’s peers.20  
The estimate of the impact of homework remains almost exactly the same.   
 Second, in column six, four state level labor market variables are added to the 
specification: the unemployment rate, the unemployment rate squared, the minimum 
wage, and an industry mix index that categorizes industries based on the average 
education level of their workers.  These variables have been shown to be important 
predictors of student homework time (McMullen 2007).  Moreover, column seven adds 
three higher education characteristics: the average tuition in four-year public institutions 
by state, the financial aid per college student by state, and state-level higher education 
appropriations per student.  The combined impact of the labor market and college market 
variables is a small increase in the estimated impact of homework, indicating that 
controlling for external economic influences does not substantially impact the estimate of 
the return to homework.   
In the final specification, shown in the seventh column, one hour of homework is 
estimated to increase as student’s mathematics test score by 0.241 standard deviations, or 
nine percentile points.  Four additional hours of math homework per week, a little over a 
standard deviation change, could move a student from the 50th percentile in mathematics 
to the 82nd percentile.  
                                                 
19 The students peers, in this case, are any students with observed test scores from the same school in the 
same year. 
 
20 Manski (1993) and Hanushek et. al. (2003) argue that peer effects of this type can introduce a bias due to 
the reintroduction of a student’s ability through the student’s influence on her peers.  The estimated impact 
of homework does not change when these variables are included, indicating that if these variables are 
problematic, they do not bias the estimate of the impact of homework. 
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Other recent studies that have estimated the impact of homework time on student 
achievement have not been able to account for both time-varying and invariant 
unobserved characteristics.  These studies found much smaller impacts.21  The results 
reported here indicate that the use of student fixed effects to control for omitted inputs  
and characteristics has consistently produced estimates that are too low.  This is likely the 
case because of a downward bias that results from measurement error, as well as 
downward bias caused by students responding to negative or positive education shocks.  
It is also likely that the impact of unobserved past inputs and characteristics biased the 
result downward, although the direction of bias from this source is uncertain.  In light of 
this, the correction provided by the instrumental variables estimate is especially valuable. 
 
First Stage Results and Instrument Validity 
It is important to demonstrate that the excluded instruments strongly predict 
students’ homework time without an independent effect on test scores.  Table 3 shows the 
first stage equations for each of the regressions from Table 2 that were estimated with 
two-stage least squares.  These results show that both hours of assigned homework and 
locus of control are important determinants of student homework time in each 
specification.  Additionally, the last row in Table 3 shows the p-value for an F-test on the 
joint significance of the excluded instruments.  The null hypothesis, that both variables 
 
                                                 
21 The estimates presented in this paper are larger in magnitude than any in Cooper et al.’s 2006 review.  
Aksoy and Link also used the NELS data, and employed student fixed effects.  See Aksoy and Link (2000) 
table three specification 1.  Their estimate is divided by 13, which is the approximate standard deviation 
reported in table 1.  They  found results similar to those in table two column three: an hour of homework 
increases mathematics achievement by 0.051 standard deviations.  The results of this study indicate that the 
true effect is much larger. 
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Table 3: First Stage Equation Estimation Results: Determinants of Student Homework Time 
Corresponding Column in Table 2: 2 4 5 6 7 
0.113 0.071 0.071 0.064 0.065 
Hours of Homework Assigned per Week*22 
(0.023) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
0.448 0.142 0.132 0.128 0.127 
Locus of Control* 
(0.053) (0.076) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) 
-0.016 -0.055 -0.060 -0.062 -0.062 
Class Size (in units of 10 students) 
(0.034) (0.041) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
0.244 0.025 0.013 -0.028 -0.032 
Certified Teacher 
(0.061) (0.144) (0.144) (0.144) (0.144) 
-0.361 -0.495 -0.507 -0.500 -0.496 
Inexperienced Teacher 
(0.113) (0.155) (0.154) (0.154) (0.154) 
-0.023 -0.027 -0.020 -0.013 -0.011 
Minimum Teacher pay 
(0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
Student Fixed Effects no yes yes yes Yes 
Peer Characteristics no no yes yes Yes 
Labor Market Characteristics no no no yes Yes 
Higher Edu. Market Characteristics no no no no Yes 
Sargan Statistic (Chi-Sq p-value) 0.253 0.655 0.608 0.694 0.679 
P-value for F-test of the joint impact of 
excluded instruments 0.000 0.006 0.006 0.012 0.011 
The asterisk denotes instruments excluded from the second stage regression.  Standard errors are shown 
in parentheses.  The dependent variable for each regression is the total hours of math homework 
reported by the student.  All regressions include wave indicators.  The sample includes 17396 
observations on 7808 students.  Column two is a pooled regression with the standard errors clustered at 
the level of the individual.  The second stage regressions are shown in Table 2. 
have no impact on student’s homework, would be rejected at less than a 2% confidence 
level for every specification. 
For these instruments to be valid, however, it is also necessary that they do not 
have an independent impact on test scores, once the impact of homework is taken into 
account.  The Sargan test for the over-identification of all instruments is reported for each 
specification in the last row of Table 2.  This test checks for a relationship between the  
 
                                                 
 
22 Because the assigned homework variable is an average of the observed teachers, who may or may not be 
the student’s mathematics instructor, parameter estimates can not be interpreted as the additional 
homework that students complete in response to an assignment. 
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instrumental variables residual and all of the exogenous variables in the model.23  The 
null hypothesis for this test is that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term, 
and thus that they are correctly excluded from the second stage equation.  The null 
hypothesis can not be rejected for any of the fixed effects specifications at any 
conventional confidence level.  This test indicates that both the student’s locus of control 
and the amount of homework assigned are valid instruments in a fixed effects 
specification. 
Despite this evidence, it is possible that the amount of assigned homework or the 
locus of control is correlated with past achievement.  To test this, I estimate the impact of 
a lagged test score on the amount of homework students were assigned, including some 
current teacher-related covariates on the right hand side.  The results are shown in Table 
4.  The estimates in the first column show that lagged test scores are strong predictors of 
each instrument when student fixed effects are not included.  When the specification 
includes student fixed effects, however, the coefficient associated with the lagged test 
                                                 
23 The Sargan statistic is obtained by regressing the IV residual on all exogenous variables, obtaining the R2 
term, and multiplying it by the number of observations.  This resulting test statistic has a Chi-squared 
distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of instruments minus the number of endogenous 
variables. 
Table 4: Testing Instrument Validity 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent 
Variable 
Without Student 
Fixed Effects 
With student 
Fixed Effects 
0.359 0.139 
Assigned HW 
Lagged Test 
Score (0.021) (0.118) 
0.180 -0.035 Locus of 
Control 
Lagged Test 
Score (0.009) (0.037) 
0.136 -0.001 
Assigned HW 
Locus of 
Control (0.018) (0.029) 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses.  Each regression includes 
a wave indicator, and the specifications in row 2 include teacher 
pay, teacher experience and teacher certification variables. 
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scores can not be distinguished from zero.  This indicates that past academic achievement 
is not correlated with the instruments when fixed effects are included. 
It is also possible that both of the instruments are correlated with the same 
unobserved student or school characteristics and contain the same bias.  In the last row 
and last column of Table 4 the locus of control is regressed on the amount of assigned 
homework in specification with student fixed effects and period intercepts.  In this 
specification the student’s locus of control has no effect on the amount of homework that 
the student is assigned.  These variables, therefore, likely do not capture any common 
unobserved variables and do provide exogenous variation in homework time. 
 
Diminishing Returns To Homework Time 
So far the econometric model estimated has restricted the impact of homework to 
a linear effect, not allowing the possibility of diminishing returns to studying.  This 
restriction is easily relaxed by estimating a second order polynomial in homework, which  
is done in Table 5.  The first two columns show the first stage equations predicting 
student 
homework time and student homework time squared.  The instruments excluded from the 
second stage equation were the amount of assigned homework, the locus of control, and 
each of these instruments squared.   
For students currently not spending any time doing mathematics homework, the 
return on completing one hour of homework per week would be about a 10 percentile 
point improvement in mathematics test scores.  This return decreases as students spend 
more time studying.  The marginal effect of studying an additional hour if the student is  
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Table 5: Decreasing Returns to Hours of Homework 
 1 2 3 
Dependent Variable Hours of Math 
HW 
Hours of Math 
HW Squared 
Math Test 
Score 
  0.295 Hours of Math Homework per 
Week   (0.059) 
  -0.012 
Hours of Math Homework Squared 
  (0.003) 
0.091 0.707  
Hours of HW Assigned per Week 
(0.051) (1.080)  
-0.003 -0.011  Hours of Homework Assigned 
Squared (0.004) (0.084)  
-0.046 -4.518  
Locus of Control 
(0.128) (2.687)  
0.173 4.089  
Locus of Control Squared 
(0.069) (1.459)  
0.065 1.398  Locus of Control Times Hours of 
Assigned Homework (0.038) (0.793)  
-0.062 -1.790 -0.015 
Class Size (in units of 10 students) 
(0.040) (0.849) (0.007) 
-0.029 -1.686 -0.020 
Teacher Certified in Subject 
(0.144) (3.025) (0.023) 
-0.503 -10.490 -0.005 
Inexperienced Teacher 
(0.154) (3.232) (0.031) 
-0.010 -0.263 0.002 
Minimum Teacher pay 
(0.010) (0.203) (0.002) 
Marginal Effect of HW    0.206 
Evaluated at the mean     (0.041) 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  The first two columns are the first stage 
equations; the third column is the second stage equation.  Each regression includes 
student fixed effects, peer characteristics, labor market and higher education market 
characteristics, and wave indicators. 
currently studying the average amount (about 3.7 hours) is a 7.5 percentile point increase 
in test scores.  These results also indicate that mathematics homework ceases to improve 
test scores if a student does more than about 11 hours per week.  By this standard, the 
majority of students could increase their test scores if they spent more time on their 
mathematics homework. 
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Table 6: Impact of Homework Time by Student Achievement and School Quality 
Group   8th Grd. Sci. Exam School Quality 
0.324 0.485 
Hours of Math Homework 
(0.088) (0.246) 
-0.017 -0.027 
Math HW Squared 
(0.005) (0.017) 
0.198 0.279 
Bottom Half 
Marginal Effect 
(0.057) (0.157) 
0.142  0.234  
Hours of Math Homework 
(0.072) (0.063) 
-0.004 -0.010 
Math HW Squared 
(0.004) (0.004) 
0.109 0.161 
Top Half 
Marginal Effect 
(0.047) (0.041) 
The impact is measured by the coefficients associated with an hour of homework per week in 
an instrumental variables regression with student fixed effects, where the dependent variable 
is the Mathematics achievement test score.  Student achievement is measured by the student's 
8th grade science test scores.  School quality is measured by the average mathematics test 
score of all other observed students in the same school. 
Impact of Homework Time by Achievement Level and School Quality 
  In this section, I will try to relax the restriction that students at different levels of 
achievement or in different types of schools receive the same return on homework time. 
To do this I estimate the specification from Table 5 separately for high achieving and low 
achieving students, as well as high and low performing schools.24  Each specification 
includes a squared term,25 and thus marginal effects are reported, evaluated at the mean  
reported homework time for the entire sample.   
First, students are separated into two groups of equal size based on their 8th grade 
science test scores.  The students in the lower achieving group experience much higher 
returns to studying than those in the high achievement group.  The impact of an hour of 
homework for the low-achievement group is large enough to improve a student’s 
                                                 
24 I also tested to see if the effect differed by class size, teacher experience, race, and parents’ income.  
None of these divisions yielded interesting differences. 
 
25 The effect is similar if the squared term is not included.  The second order polynomial is used in this 
section because this specification results in more precise estimates. 
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mathematics achievement by 7.6 percentile points.  An additional hour of homework by a 
high achieving student, however, only improves her achievement by 4 percentile points.   
This indicates that students who fall behind do have some ability to catch up to 
their peers simply by doing the same amount of homework.  For example, consider a 
student in the low achievement group, who is currently spending one hour on homework  
each week. By studying three hours more per week, this student could move from the 25th 
percentile to the 50th percentile in a single year.  A student in the high achievement 
group, who is currently studying one hour a week, would have to study seven additional 
hours each week to make a similar move from the 50th to the 75th percentile.  This 
evidence does not support the common assumption that more able students receive a 
higher return to homework time because their time is more productive (Neilson, 2005; 
Eren and Henderson, 2007). 
Second, students were split into groups of equal size based on the test score performance 
of their peers, as a general measure of school quality.  Students in the lower performing 
schools experienced a return to homework time that was twice as strong as those in high 
performing schools.  A student in a low performing school, who currently studies one 
hour each week that wanted to move from the 50th percentile to the 75th percentile, would 
have to study 1.8 additional hours per week, whereas a student in a high performing 
school would have to study four additional hours to improve the same amount.  This may 
indicate that at low performing schools homework is a stronger determinant of success.  
Bishop (2007) reports that less material is presented in class time in low performing 
schools, which may partially explain why studying at home would be more beneficial for 
these students.  Overall, this investigation provides evidence that  
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students’ achievement in mathematics can be dramatically improved by effort, even if the 
student finds herself at the bottom end of the achievement distribution in a low 
performing school. 
 
Impact of Assigned Homework on Academic Achievement 
 While students are able to adjust the amount of time they spend on homework 
directly, the more realistic policy instrument is the amount of homework that teachers 
assign.  Teachers’ assignments, even if only completed a fraction of the time, have a 
strong influence on the amount of homework students complete.  For comparison, the  
regression below shows the impact of a series of policy instruments, including the 
amount of mathematics homework assigned by teachers per week (hit), on a mathematics 
test score (TSit):
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(12)
 
2
70.020 0.0007 0.012 0.018 0.018 0.002
         (0.005)     (0.0002)    (0.006)    (0.021)    (0.024)    (0.001)
itit it it it it it it t i it
TS h h s c x p pc wα µ ε= − − − − + + + + +
 
Where sit is the school class size (in units of 10 students), cit indicates that the teacher is 
certified in mathematics, xit is the fraction of the students’ observed teachers that have 
less than three years of teaching experience, pit is the minimum teacher pay in the 
students’ school, pcit is a pair of peer characteristics variables including an average of 
peers’ test scores and the average amount of homework completed by the student’s peers.  
Additionally wt is a set of wave-specific dummy variables, iµ  is a student specific  
 
                                                 
26 This regression is on a smaller sample of 9776 observations on 4990 students.  This is the sample of 
students who have multiple responses by a mathematics instructor.  The larger sample consists of students 
who study math but may or may not have had a mathematics instructor interviewed. 
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Table 7: Impact of a $10,000 per classroom investment: 
Policy Impact: SD Impact: Percentile Points 
0.071 2.67 
Increasing Assigned Homework 
(0.023)  
0.020 0.80 
Increasing Teachers' Wages 
(0.012)  
0.006 0.24 
Decreasing Class Size 
(0.003)   
Results are calculated using the coefficients reported in equation 12, an average class size of 
25, average yearly teachers' wage of $47,602, an hourly wage of $29.75 for teachers, and an 
opportunity cost of $10.37 for students.  Standard errors are shown in parentheses.  See 
appendix C for calculations. 
intercept or fixed effect, and itε  is the error term.
27  The effects of teacher certification 
and teacher experience are not precisely estimated; neither effect is statistically different 
from zero at any conventional confidence level.  These two policies are excluded from 
the following analysis.  The marginal effect of assigning an additional hour of homework 
for students currently being assigned the average amount (2.9 hours per week) is 0.016 
(standard error 0.004) test score standard deviations.   
 To compare the size of these effects, it is useful to do a comparison of the cost of 
implementing each policy, and the resulting academic achievement gains.  Table 7 shows 
the impact on mathematics achievement of a $10,000 investment in three possible 
policies.  To approximate the social cost of assigning more homework, I assume that 
teachers are paid almost $30 an hour for their time.  The time of the students is valued at 
the average wage in 1990 for teenagers between the ages of 16 and 18 converted to 2005 
dollars, plus the present discounted value of the return that students receive from an 
additional hour of work experience.  The total opportunity cost in 2005 dollars is 
estimated to be $10.37.28  The cost of decreasing class size is limited here to the cost of  
 
                                                 
27 For the full results from the regression shown in equation 12, see appendix B. 
 
28 For a complete description of all of the cost calculations that went into table 7, see appendix C. 
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Table 8: Impact of Assigned Homework on Mathematics Achievement by 
Achievement and School Quality 
  8th Grade Sci. Exams School Quality 
0.012  0.013  
Bottom Half 
(0.005) (0.005) 
0.004  0.002  
Top Half 
(0.004) (0.004) 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses.  For each result, assigned homework is used to 
predict mathematics achievement in a student fixed effect regression specification.  
Teacher experience, certification, salary, class size, peer effects, and wave indicators 
were also included in each specification.  Prior Achievement is measured using the 
students' 8th grade science achievement test.  School quality is measured using the 
average test score of other observed students in the same school. 
hiring additional teachers.  The cost of building new classrooms and the impact of 
decreasing teacher quality are not considered here.  Using these values and the parameter 
estimates from equation 12, I can calculate the approximate number of new hours of 
homework,  that can be completed for a $10,000 investment, and the impact of that 
homework increase.  The calculations that went into Table 7 are shown in appendix C.  
 The first column shows the impact in on mathematics achievement in standard 
deviations, the second shows the impact in percentile point improvements.  Assigning 
additional homework is estimated to have 3.5 times the impact of increasing teachers’ 
wages for a given monetary investment.  Similarly, assigning additional homework has  
over 11 times the impact per dollar of decreasing class size. 
Finally, it is worth exploring whether this policy will have a differential impact 
based on school quality and prior student achievement.  Table 8 shows the impact of 
assigning additional mathematics homework for the top and bottom halves of the 
achievement and school quality distributions.  The impact is estimated with similar 
precision for each subgroup, but the effect is much smaller for high performing students 
and students in high performing schools.  Assigning an additional hour of homework per 
week to a student whose peers are, on average, below the 50th percentile in mathematics 
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achievement is estimated to improve their achievement by 1/2 of a percentile point.  
Comparing this effect to the impacts in Table 7, a $10,000 investment put into increasing 
homework for a classroom of students in this low-performing group would increase each 
student’s achievement by .084 standard deviations, or 3.36 percentile points.  This effect 
is larger than the impacts of similar investments in homework, teachers’ wages, or class 
sizes shown in Table 7.29    
 
VII. Conclusions 
The results in this paper strongly support the argument that policies that increase 
the time that students spend on their homework, and policies that increase the amount of 
assigned homework are likely to increase the performance of low-performing students 
and those in low-performing schools.  Specifically, students who do an extra hour of 
mathematics homework per week achieved 8 to 9 percentile points better than their peers 
on standardized exams.  Because the sample used is nationally representative, the results 
should be applicable to a number of school settings.  As a caveat however, there is some 
evidence that the sample used for this analysis suffers from non-random attrition due to 
dropouts and/or incomplete survey response. 
As a tool of policy, increasing the amount of homework that students complete 
shows some promise.  Assigning additional homework is estimated to have a much larger 
                                                 
29 It is difficult to measure the difference in impact of teacher salaries and class size between these groups, 
because of the imprecise estimates.  The impact of decreasing class size and increasing teachers’ wages by 
school quality and student performance is as follows (standard errors in parentheses): decreasing class size 
by 10 students is estimated to increase performance by 0.017 (0.012) standard deviations among low 
performing students, 0.015 (0.012) standard deviations among high performing students, 0.03 (0.03) 
standard deviations among students in low performing schools, and 0.013 (0.008) standard deviations 
among students in high performing schools.  Increasing teachers wages by $1000 is estimated to increase 
achievement by 0.0008 (0.002) standard deviations among low performing students, 0.002 (0.002) standard 
deviations among high performing students, -0.007 (0.006) standard deviations among students in low 
performing schools, and 0.004 (0.002) standard deviations among students in high performing schools. 
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impact per dollar invested than either increasing teachers’ wages or decreasing class 
sizes.  Additionally, because much of the benefit of assigning additional homework goes 
to low-achieving students and students in low-performing schools, this policy could be 
useful for lowering the achievement gap between high achieving and low achieving 
students. 
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Chapter 3: Do High School Students Respond to Labor Market and Education 
Incentives?  An Analysis of Homework Time and Dropout Rates 
 
Introduction 
In the labor economics and education literature, there is some evidence that 
student achievement is correlated with economic conditions (Bishop 1991).  While it is 
often assumed that students consider labor market incentives when choosing how long to 
remain in school, choices students make in school have largely been ignored.  This paper 
presents evidence that students respond to labor market opportunities when making 
choices about both school enrollment and study time.  Moreover, the evidence suggests 
that students are not merely trading off school work for labor market participation, but 
are instead considering future labor market opportunities when deciding how much time 
to spend on homework. 
 In order to understand the relationship between students’ education choices and 
external incentives, I present a model of forward looking students with incomplete 
information about future labor market conditions.  Within such a framework, students 
choose to either stay in school or drop out based on both present and expected future 
labor market opportunities.  Similarly, students choose how much time to spend on 
homework based primarily on expected future returns in higher education and the labor 
market.
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 Informed by this model, I estimate the impact of labor market variables on both 
the probability that a student will drop out of high school and the amount of time students 
devote to homework.  In order to address possible biases due to geographic selection and 
unobserved individual heterogeneity, I estimate specifications that include state and 
individual fixed effects, and control for important individual and family demographic 
characteristics. 
 I find that the probability of dropping out of school and the amount of homework 
that students complete are both influenced by education and labor market conditions.  
Shifts in the state industry mix toward higher-education jobs are associated with lower 
dropout rates and increases in student homework.  Additionally, a higher minimum wage 
decreases dropout rates and increases the amount of homework that students do.  Finally, 
a higher unemployment rate increases the amount of homework that students complete. 
 
Background literature on the relationship between students’ education choices and 
their opportunities: 
The current research dealing with student decision making while in high school 
has focused primarily on enrollment choices.  This focus has left students’ other 
decisions, such as how much homework to do, relatively unexamined.  There is strong 
evidence for example, that students’ decisions to drop out of high school are dependent 
on immediate labor market incentives, such as changes in low-skill wages (Black, 
McKinnish, and Sanders 2005; Gustman and Steinmeier 1981).  Ribar (1993, 2001) 
found mixed evidence that young people who have completed high school respond to 
returns to education and changes in average wages when making enrollment decisions.  
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Others have looked at the impact of unemployment trends and found that their effect on 
enrollment is small, (Ihlanfeldt 1992) and that it varies substantially between men and 
women (Card and Lemieux 1997).  Finally, there is evidence that students’ college 
enrollment decisions are dependent on their current labor market opportunities 
(Fredriksson 1997) as well as changes in the return to education (Card and Lemieux 
2001). 
In a closely related issue, there has been considerable research regarding the 
impact of the minimum wage on school enrollment.  Using the Leighton and Mincer 
(1981) framework, the theoretical predictions about this relationship are ambiguous.  An 
increase in the minimum wage can have multiple effects: the anticipated wage if 
employed can increase, the probability of employment can decrease, and the return to 
skill can increase.  If a student’s wage prospects30 fall, because the increased 
unemployment probability outweighs the increase in wages, then students will demand 
more schooling.  If wage prospects increase, students may still demand more schooling if 
the returns to schooling increase faster than wage prospects.  This could occur as a result 
of firms substituting more skilled workers for less skilled workers in response to the wage 
regulation.  If, however, wage prospects increase faster than the return to schooling, 
students at the margin will choose to substitute labor market activity for continued 
schooling, and drop out of school.31   
                                                 
30 Leighton and Mincer define “wage prospects” as the minimum wage times the perceived probability of 
finding employment in the covered sector.  In the case of risk neutrality, this is equal to the expected wage, 
in the case of risk aversion, wage prospects will be lower than the expected wage. 
 
31 Agell and Lommerud (1997) propose a model in which the effect of a minimum wage is to increase 
investment in education among those of moderate skill, and decrease education among those with low skill.  
I find that the opposite seems to occur: students with low academic performance have the stronger positive 
enrollment and homework responses to a higher minimum wage. 
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The empirical research on the topic has produced mixed results.  Neumark and 
Wascher (1995a, 1995b, 2003) have found that students are more likely to drop out of 
school when the minimum wage increases.  Chaplin, Turner and Pape (2003), found 
similar results, but only among younger students in states that did not have school 
attendance requirements after age 16.  Matilla (1978), however found a positive 
enrollment response, and Cunningham (1981) found a positive enrollment response for 
some groups and a negative response for others.   
 Students may also make decisions about the amount of time to spend on 
homework based on expected future labor market conditions.  Bishop (1991), documents 
a relationship between high school student achievement test scores and the return to 
education.  His framework attributes this relationship to students choosing to exert 
additional effort when returns to education are higher; however he is not able to 
document this claim with data on study time.  Similarly, Georgia’s Hope scholarship 
program has been the subject of a series of studies, one of which shows that student 
achievement has increased among students near the margin of qualification for the 
program (Henry and Rubenstein 2002).  Again, without data on student effort, this 
achievement gain is attributed to increased time on homework.  Thus, while the literature 
has not directly addressed the possible relationship between homework time and 
education or labor market incentives, these studies suggest two possible determinants of 
student homework time: the labor market return to education and the price of college 
education. 
 If doing homework is rewarded in the form of higher wages, it is likely that this 
return is not realized immediately upon entering the labor market.  Farber and Gibbons 
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(1996) propose a dynamic model of learning about worker ability in the labor market 
which predicts that time invariant abilities, such as the cognitive human capital not 
reflected in years of schooling, will be increasingly correlated with wages as the worker’s 
experience in the labor market increases.  As time passes employers learn about workers’ 
true productivity, and workers wages will thus more accurately reflect human capital as 
their years of experience increase.  This prediction is supported by their empirical work 
as well as that of others (Murnane, Willett, and Levy 1995, Bishop 1992).  The 
implication of these findings is that students’ effort in school to build up human capital 
will likely pay off later in their working careers, while their years of schooling will pay 
off immediately after leaving school.   
 
A model of students’ education and homework choices: 
 The following three-period model illustrates the possible influences that labor 
market conditions and education incentives can have on students’ choices.  Students face 
a standard tradeoff between consumption and leisure, choosing how many hours to work 
in each period, how much time to spend doing homework in the first period, whether to 
drop out of high school, and whether to attend college.  In the first period, students can 
choose to complete high school, in which case their first period utility U1 depends on 
their choice of the number of hours to work (h1) and the amount of time to spend on 
homework (HW).  In each period, there is some probability, determined by the period 
specific unemployment rate tµ , that work will not materialize, and the student will be 
constrained to zero hours of work for that period, yielding a utility in which consumption 
is determined by y, the student’s consumption endowment. 
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(1)   ( )1 1 1,L hsU u y w h T HW h t= + − − −  
Here T is the student’s endowment of time, wL is the wage earned by workers without a 
high school degree, and ths is the amount of time devoted to attending high school. 
Students observe employment opportunities before deciding whether to drop out 
of high school, still a student could drop out of high school even if employment in period 
one is not an option.  If the student chooses to drop out of high school, their first period 
utility is determined by the following: 
(2)    ( )1 1 1,LU u y w h T h= + −  
 Students discount future utility at a rate β .  In the second period, if the student 
chose to complete high school, the student can now choose either to attend college, or to 
enter the labor market full time.  If college is chosen the student’s second period utility is 
as follows: 
(3)   ( ) ( )( )2 2 2,hs collegeU u y w HW h C HW T h t= + − − −  
Where with probability 2µ  the student’s hours of work are constrained to zero.  
Consumption in college is dependent on the cost of college, C, which is a function of how 
much homework the student completed in high school.  Additionally, the wage of 
students who finish high school is also a function of their high school homework time.  If 
instead the student chooses to enter the labor market, their utility is: 
(4)   ( )( )2 2 2,hsU u y w HW h T h= + −  
As before, with probability 2µ  the student’s hours of work are constrained to zero. 
 In the third period students enter the labor market full time.  Those who finish 
college now earn a wage equal to wc, also a function of the amount of homework the 
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student completed, whereas students who did not attend college still earn a the wage whs.  
Their third period utility functions differ only by the wage and their chosen hours of 
work.  In each case, the probability that h3 is constrained to equal zero is 3µ . 
(5)    
( )( )
( )( )
3 3 3
3 3 3
,
,
c
hs
U u y w HW h T h
U u y w HW h T h
= + −
= + −
 
In this framework, students have two complementary ways to invest in human 
capital, one is to stay in school and the other is to complete more homework in the first 
period.  Homework pays off both in terms of higher wages and lower college costs.   
Optimal investments in human capital will depend on the exogenous inputs into the 
model, including the cost of college, the unemployment rate, and the return on human 
capital.32  If a student has a high discount rate, a future positive return on homework time 
may not he large enough to compensate students for the lost leisure or disutility from 
doing homework in the first period.  If this is the case, they may spend little or no time 
doing homework.   
Also, students observe the future cost of higher education and future labor market 
conditions with uncertainty.  If their expectations of future conditions are functions of the 
current state, then the optimal schooling, homework, and hours of work choices will 
depend on current period wages, college tuition costs, and unemployment. 
                                                 
32 The wage gain in the third period that a student will receive for completing college 
is: ( ) ( )c hsw HW w HW− , empirically this will likely be positive.  The return that a student receives for 
doing an additional hour of homework while in high school will be different depending on the student’s 
choice of education attainment.  For high school dropouts, there is no return on homework, for high school 
and college graduates, the return in future wages is i
dw
dHW
, where i is the education level of the student.   
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This model also provides some conditions under which the labor market 
parameters will certain effects on student’s human capital investments.33  In the simple 
case in which the student does not choose the hours worked, an increase in the 
unemployment rate will decrease the amount homework students complete because of the 
decreased probability of a future wage or tuition reward.  If hours of work are chosen, 
then the result is mixed.  If we assume a non-backward bending labor supply curve, then 
the result will be the same.  But absent this assumption, a increase in unemployment 
could cause a decrease in expected future income, if this income effect is strong enough 
to overwhelm the substitution effect (substituting leisure for homework because the 
reward for homework has fallen) then students could increase their homework time in 
response to a lower unemployment rate. 
An increase in the unemployment rate, in this framework, will always cause 
students to be more likely to drop out of school.  This arises because students know their 
employment opportunities for period 1 (either they have a job available or not), so the 
unemployment rate only changes the probability of employment in future periods. 
   
Estimating the impact of labor market conditions on the probability of dropping out 
of high school: 
 For the estimation of the impact of labor market conditions on the probability of 
dropping out of school, I employ a discrete time hazard framework as shown below: 
(6) 
* *
1 0 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1
*
*
( | 0)
1 if student is not enrolled in school at time t.
0 if student is enrolled in school at time t.
ijt ijt jt jt jt jt ijt ijt
ijt
ijt
Y Y U I M C X
Y
Y
α α α α α α ξ− − − − − −= = + + + + + +
=
=
 
                                                 
33 For a derivation of these results, see appendix G. 
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Where Uj is the state specific unemployment rate, Ij is a variable that captures how 
education-intensive the industries are in state j.  Mj is the state specific minimum wage 
rate, and Cj is the cost of public college education.  Additionally, Xij is a vector of student 
and family characteristics, and can be included to capture important differences between 
demographic groups.  I estimate equation (6) using a probit estimator.  The parameter 
estimates, when transformed into marginal effects, can be interpreted as the impact of a 
given labor market variable on the probability that a student will drop out of school.   
 Student’s dropout decision can occur anytime between the survey periods.  In the 
NELS data, that means the student could have dropped out of high school up to 1.5  to 2 
years prior to it showing up in the next survey.  For this reason lagged labor market 
conditions are used to predict dropout behavior.  When the same specifications are 
estimated using current labor market conditions, the econometric model’s explanatory 
power falls dramatically. 
 
Estimating the impact of labor market conditions on students’ homework time: 
A simple way to estimate the impact of education and labor market incentives on 
homework choices would be to use ordinary least squares to estimate the following 
specification: 
(7) 0 1 2 3 4 5ij j j j j ij ijH U I M C Xβ β β β β β ε= + + + + + +  
Where Hij is the hours of homework that student i in state j reports completing per week.  
In this reduced form specification, the impact of these education and labor market 
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variables can be interpreted as the response of students to these incentives when choosing 
how much homework to complete.34   
In the specification described above, the parameters of interest will only be 
estimated without bias if there is no unobserved component that influences both the labor 
market conditions and the amount of homework that students complete.  For example, it 
is possible that there is some characteristic of a household that makes parents more likely 
to select a certain labor market, and also causes them to encourage their child to study 
more in high school.  If this characteristic is not fully accounted for with variables about 
parents’ labor force status, education, income and other family characteristics in the data 
set, then this selection into a particular labor market could bias the estimates of each 
parameter.  This problem could also occur, as the labor market changes, if people move 
to areas with lower unemployment or higher wages.  It is likely, however, that some 
portion of this selection happens within states, and since I am using state-wide measures 
of labor market characteristics, this should be less of a problem.  The problem remains, 
however, if people select their home state based on some unobservable characteristic. 
If the problematic omitted variables are state-level characteristics that correlate 
with both the labor market variables and student effort, then unbiased estimates can be 
obtained by including state fixed effects.  This requires significant variation over time in 
the labor market conditions however, since the cross-state variation will be absorbed by 
the fixed effects.   
It is also possible that the unobserved family or student characteristics are 
correlated with the labor market characteristics.  If these variables do not change over 
                                                 
34 Because homework time is conditional on a student not dropping out of school, all of the results for this 
section are valid for the sample of students who remain in school at least through the 10th grade.   
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time or the migration is sufficiently slower than the observed changes in the labor market, 
unbiased estimates can be obtained by estimating a specification that includes student 
fixed effects.  Student fixed effects will also fix problems associated with selection at 
other levels, such as selection at the school or class level, if the selection is based on 
individual characteristics.  This approach also requires variation in the labor market 
variables of interest over time. 
 
Data 
 The primary data I am exploring on students’ behavior and characteristics will 
come from the National Education Longitudinal Study of 1988 (NELS).  The labor 
market data comes from the 1988, 1990, and 1992 Current Population Survey (CPS) 
March supplement, and the Department of Labor.  The higher education variables come 
from the Almanac of Higher Education (Chronicle of Higher Education 1989, 1991, 
1993). 
 The NELS was designed to be a nationally representative sample of students in 
the 8th grade in 1988.  Surveys were given to the student, one of the student’s parents, 
two of the student’s teachers, and one school representative three times: in 8th, 10th, and 
12th grade.  The students were also given exams in four subjects.  Due to low response to 
some parts of the survey many of the original observations were dropped from the sample 
used in this analysis.  The remaining sample has similar characteristics to the broader 
sample; for an explanation of the drops and a comparison of the sample statistics, see 
appendix F.  In the final sample, 36698 observations over three periods are used to 
analyze student’s homework completion.   
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Table 1: Selected Summary Statistics 
  Wave 1 (1988) Wave 2 (1990) Wave 3 (1992) 
Variable Mean SD Mean  SD Mean SD 
Hours of Homework Completed per Week 6.061 5.095 7.926 6.539 14.129 9.663 
Unemployment Rate (2-year ave.) 6.054 1.787 5.476 1.207 6.879 1.621 
Minimum Wage (2007 dollars) 5.901 0.163 5.600 0.489 6.311 0.115 
Industry Education Score 8.067 0.168 8.091 0.173 8.094 0.165 
Public 4-year tuition (in 1000's of 2007 dollars) 2.787 0.901 3.025 1.059 3.584 1.203 
Observations 18294   11785   6619   
Dropped Out of School   0.030 0.169 0.040 0.197 
Unemployment Rate (2-year ave.)   6.051 1.781 5.490 1.155 
Minimum Wage (1990 dollars)   5.903 0.174 5.637 0.527 
Industry Education Score   8.068 0.167 8.097 0.178 
Public 4-year tuition (in 1000's of 2007 dollars)     2.776 0.895 2.995 1.056 
Observations   20870  19573  
 
The sample used to examine dropout rates is less restricted because a different set 
of covariates is used for this analysis, but is limited to the 2nd and 3rd waves in order to 
perform the hazard analysis.  This sub sample includes 40595 observations over two 
periods.  In this group, 3 percent of students who were in the survey in 8th grade had 
dropped out by 10th grade, and 4 percent of those in the survey in 10th grade had dropped 
out of school by 12th grade.  Table 1 shows selected summary statistics for the two 
samples.  For variable definitions, see appendix A. 
The primary measure of effort will be the number of hours the student spends on 
homework per week.  This measure includes homework on all subjects, and is student 
reported.  A student is determined to have dropped out of school only if the survey can 
confirm that the student is not attending school.  This results in slightly lower dropout  
rates35, since it is likely that some of the students who do not show up in later waves have 
dropped out of school but the survey organization was unable to confirm their status.  
                                                 
35 The cumulative dropout rate for this sample is 3% for students between 8th and 10th grade and 4% for 
students between 10th and 12th grade, producing a 7% cumulative dropout rate in this sample.    In the 
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This restricted sample of dropouts is preferable to using a graduation rate, since many 
students who do not remain in the study may have lost contact for another reason. 
To create the education-industry mix variable I utilize the 1988, 1990 and 1992 
Current Population Survey March supplement data, all from the IPUMS data archive 
(King et al. 2008).  I restricted this sample to those between ages 16 and 65 who are not 
residing in group quarters.  This variable is created by first assigning a value to each 
industry that equaled the average education level of its observed workers.  Second, each 
state is assigned a value created using a weighted average of these education scores, 
where the weights are the number of employees in that particular industry in the state in a 
given year.36  Changes in this variable over time reflect changes in the education-intensity 
of the jobs available in the state. 
  The minimum wage variable is defined as the highest applicable legal wage 
minimum, either the state or federal minimum wage for the given year, adjusted for 
inflation using the consumer price index.  There were 16 states that had state minimum 
wage laws that exceeded the federal legal minimum at some point over the four year 
period, and all states experienced a change in the legal minimum at some point over this 
four year window. 
 
 The unemployment information comes from the local area unemployment 
statistics data available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  The variable is constructed 
                                                                                                                                                 
sample not restricted by the covariate set, the cumulative dropout rate is 9.7%.  The National Center For 
Education Statistics (2002) found that in 1992, about 11% of 16 to 24 year olds were currently high school 
dropouts, indicating that about 12% of dropouts were not confirmed as such by the survey.  For a 
discussion of the differences between the sub-sample and full NELS sample, see appendix F. 
 
36 The CPS person weights were used to ensure that these averages were representative of the state 
population. 
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by averaging the monthly state level unemployment rate for the current and previous 
year.  Changing the construction of this variable to a one month or one year average does 
not noticeably change the results. 
 
Results – The impact of labor market conditions on students’ dropout choices 
 The probit estimates of the impact of labor market variables on the probability 
that students will drop out of school are shown in Table 2.  Marginal effects are reported,  
evaluated at the sample mean of each variable.37   In the first specification, the cost of 
higher education, measured here as the average (tuition) cost of a 4-year public college 
education, has a small negative impact on the probability of dropping out of school, 
though the parameter estimate is not statistically different from zero.  The industry 
education score, which measures how education-intensive the industries in the state are, 
is a strong predictor of student dropout behavior.  The standard deviation of this variable 
is about 0.17 in this data;38 a change of this magnitude is estimated to decrease the 
probability of dropping out of high school by 0.65 percentage points.   A higher 
unemployment rate is estimated to decrease the probability of dropping out of school, 
with the biggest impact for increases in the range below 5%.  Finally, a $1 increase the  
 
 
                                                 
37 The marginal effects are computed for continuous variables as ( )' xφ β β where ( )φ ⋅  is the standard 
normal density function, x is vector of covariates, and β is the vector of estimated coefficients.  Marginal 
effects for the dichotomous variables are calculated for a discrete change in the dependent variable from 0 
to 1. 
 
38 The average 2-year change in the industry education score is about 0.1, so a one standard deviation 
change is reasonable. 
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Table 2: The Impact of Labor Market Conditions on the Probability 
of Dropping Out of High School. 
  2 3 
-0.0003 -0.0009 Public four year college tuition (in 
thousands) (0.0014) (0.0010) 
-0.0327 -0.0121 
Industry Education Score 
(0.0068) (0.0044) 
-0.0040 -0.0018 Unemployment rate:  
4.8 to 5.5 percent (0.0058) (0.0042) 
-0.0042 -0.0030 Unemployment rate: 
5.5 to 6.3 percent (0.0033) (0.0023) 
-0.0044 -0.0013 Unemployment rate: 
6.3 to 7.5 percent 0.0038  (0.0027) 
-0.0070 -0.0026 Unemployment rate: 
above 7.5 percent (0.0042) (0.0033) 
-0.0063 -0.0047 
Minimum Wage 
(0.0030) (0.0023) 
Individual Characteristics X X 
Family Characteristics  X 
Discrete time hazard model, estimated as a probit, with standard errors (in 
parentheses) clustered at the state level.  A time period is two years.  The 
unemployment rate is the two year monthly average over the current and 
previous year, the excluded unemployment rate category is from 2.4 to 4.8 
percent.  Other variables are lagged one period.  The total number of 
observations is 40443.  Marginal effects are reported.  All specifications 
include a wave three intercept.  Individual characteristics include sex, race, 
and locus of control.  Family characteristics include parents education, 
income, and whether the family owns more than 50 books.  All monetary 
values are in 2007 dollars. 
 
minimum wage, contrary to the findings of some of the literature,39 is estimated to 
decrease the probability of dropping out by 0.74 percentage points. 
The second specification includes parent’s characteristics.  Controlling for these 
observable demographic characteristics decreases the magnitude of all of the parameter 
estimates except the impact of increasing the cost of public higher education.  Students 
are estimated to somewhat decrease their probability of dropping out of school in  
                                                 
39 Neumark and Wascher (1995a, 1995b, 2003) and Chaplin, Turner and Pape (2003) both find that 
increases in the minimum wage increase dropout rates, Evans and Turner (1995) challenged this result.  
Matilla (1978) and Cunningham (1981) both found decreased dropout rates as a result of higher minimum 
wages. 
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Table 3: The Impact of labor market conditions on the probability of dropping out by sex, 
achievement, and income. 
Group Female Male High Income Low Income 
High 
Achievement 
Low 
Achievement 
-0.0010 -0.0009 -0.0017 -0.0007 -0.0018 0.0002 Public four year college 
tuition (in thousands) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0015) 
-0.0153 -0.0085 -0.0046 -0.0154 -0.0071 -0.0147 Industry Education 
Score (0.0060) (0.0052) (0.0073) (0.0061) (0.0037) (0.0066) 
0.0017 -0.0056 0.0037 -0.0046 0.0007 -0.0049 Unemployment rate:  
4.8 to 5.5 percent (0.0039) (0.0052) (0.0032) (0.0053) (0.0024) (0.0072) 
-0.0010 -0.0052 0.0036 -0.0065 -0.0006 -0.0067 Unemployment rate: 
5.5 to 6.3 percent (0.0024) (0.0032) (0.0025) (0.0030) (0.0023) (0.0039) 
-0.0005 -0.0021 0.0045 -0.0042 0.0024 -0.0067 Unemployment rate: 
6.3 to 7.5 percent (0.0031) (0.0037) (0.0032) (0.0036) (0.0022) (0.0041) 
-0.0022 -0.0027 0.0042 -0.0056 0.0045 -0.0111 Unemployment rate: 
above 7.5 percent (0.0032) (0.0046) (0.0031) (0.0042) (0.0027) (0.0050) 
-0.0057 -0.0036 -0.0019 -0.0071 -0.0006 -0.0093 
Minimum Wage 
(0.0025) (0.0028) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0019) (0.0043) 
Observations 20460 19983 18452 21991 21001 19442 
Discrete time hazard model, estimated as a probit, with standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the 
state level.  A time period is two years.  The unemployment rate is the two year monthly average over the 
current and previous year, the excluded unemployment rate category is from 2.4 to 4.8 percent.  Other 
variables are lagged one period.  Marginal effects are reported.  All specifications include a wave three 
intercept.  Individual characteristics include sex, race, and locus of control.  Family characteristics include 
parents education, income, and whether the family owns more than 50 books.  All monetary values are in 
2007 dollars.  The income specifications are split based on annual family income in 8th grade.  The 
achievement specifications are split based on 8th grade achievement exams in four core subjects. 
 
response to an increase in college tuition.  The degree to which industries in the state are 
education intensive does have an impact that is significant at the 5% confidence level: the 
estimates indicate that a standard deviation increase in this measure decreases the 
probability of dropping out of high school by 0.26 percentage points.  The effect of the 
minimum wage is also somewhat diminished, but these estimates still indicate that a $1 
increase in the minimum wage decreases the probability of dropping out by 0.59 
percentage points.40 
                                                 
40 For full results from specification 2, see appendix B.  These results are robust to changes in the 
specification.  Neither adding interaction terms or relaxing linear specification for the variables of interest 
changes the qualitative results. 
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There is some evidence that that young men and young women respond 
differently to labor market incentives (Ribar 2001, Card and Lemieux 2001).41  Using the 
same specification used in column 3 of Table 2, Table 3 shows estimates the effects 
separately by sex, parents’ income, and achievement in 8th grade.  In general, women, 
low-income students, and those with low achievement are more responsive than their 
counterparts.  Specifically, women are almost twice as responsive to changes in the 
degree of education-intensity in industry, and their response to changes in the minimum 
wage is 77% larger than the response of men.  Conversely, men seem more responsive to 
changes in the unemployment rate than women, though the estimates are very imprecise. 
 Increased college tuition is associated with a decreased probability of dropping 
out of school for almost all students, with the largest impact among high achieving 
students.  Even with this group the impact is not large: a $1000 increase in public tuition 
decreases the probability of dropping out by 0.18 percentage points.  It is young women, 
low income students and low achieving students, however, that respond to changes in the 
industry mix.  A one standard deviation increase in the industry-education variable 
corresponds with a 0.42 percentage point and 0.32 percentage point decrease in the 
probability that low income and low achieving students respectively, will drop out of 
high school.  Similarly, while high income and high achieving students have little or no 
response to a change in the minimum wage, low income and low achieving students 
respond to a dollar increase in the minimum wage by increasing their enrollment in high 
                                                 
 
41 There are a number of reasons that women and men might respond to labor market signals differently, at 
the time that this data was collected, women had lower high school graduation rates, lower college 
attendance rates (conditional on high school completion), and lower labor force attachment (Card and 
Lemieux 2001).  For this reason it makes sense that more women might be on the margin between entering 
the labor market or not, and are more likely to be swayed by changes in the minimum wage or returns to 
education.  Similarly, with lower labor force attachment, they may be less influenced by unemployment 
rate changes. 
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school.  The size of the impact for low income students is about 1.3 percentage points for 
both groups.  The impact of changes in the unemployment rates for these groups is less 
clear.  Both low achieving and low income students in general have a stronger response 
than their counterparts, though the direction of the impact is not consistent, and the 
magnitudes of many of the effects are not statistically different from zero.   
  
Results – The impact of education and labor market incentives on students’ 
homework time 
In addition to choosing whether or not to finish high school, students also choose how 
much effort to exert while in school.  The amount of time spent on homework is one 
avenue for students to exert effort and invest in human capital.  Table 4 shows the results 
of four regression specifications, each predicting student homework time using state level  
college tuition prices and a series of labor market variables.  The estimates in column one 
indicate that a one thousand dollar increase in four year public university tuition 
decreases students’ homework time by about 13 minutes per week.  A standard deviation 
increase in the industry-education score corresponds to an increase in homework time of 
about 23 minutes per week.  The estimate for the impact of the minimum wage indicates 
that a $1 increase in the minimum wage in a state will increase the amount of homework 
that students do by about 21 minutes per week.  The impact of the unemployment rate has 
high standard errors, and in this specification, is estimated to have a generally positive 
impact on the amount of homework that students complete. 42 
 
                                                 
42 Because I use a homework measure which combines all subjects, very few students report doing zero 
hours of homework per week.  For this reason, tobit estimates of the impact of labor market conditions on 
homework time are extremely similar to OLS estimates. 
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Table 4: The response of students' homework time to labor market conditions 
  1 2 3 4 
-0.222 -0.240 -0.011 -0.086 Public four year college 
tuition (in thousands) (0.113) (0.092) (0.182) (0.189) 
2.242 0.670 0.973 1.096 
Industry Education Score 
(0.605) (0.508) (0.694) (0.728) 
0.056 -0.110 -0.757 -0.892 Unemployment rate:  
4.8 to 5.5 percent (0.274) (0.228) (0.168) (0.182) 
-0.042 0.068 -1.072 -1.089 Unemployment rate: 
5.5 to 6.3 percent (0.254) (0.209) (0.162) (0.176) 
0.095 0.071 -1.373 -1.334 Unemployment rate: 
6.3 to 7.5 percent (0.283) (0.214) (0.204) (0.223) 
0.147 0.091 -1.482 -1.512 Unemployment rate: 
above 7.5 percent (0.347) (0.271) (0.241) (0.264) 
0.353 0.381 0.411 0.405 
Minimum Wage 
(0.258) (0.247) (0.160) (0.173) 
 Student, Family, and Peer 
Achievement  
X X X 
  
State Fixed Effects 
  
X  
   
Student Fixed Effects 
      
X 
The dependent variable in each specification is the number of hours of homework 
completed per week.  Each regression has a sample of 36698 observations.  Standard errors 
are clustered at the state level.  The excluded unemployment rate category is from 2.4 to 4.8 
percent.  The student, family, and peer characteristics include the amount of homework 
assigned, the students' locus of control, an average of the peers' test scores in the student 
fixed effects specifications, and these variables plus parents' education, income and whether 
the family owns more than 50 books in the specificiatons without student fixed effects.  
Each specification includes wave indicators.  All monetary values are in 2007 dollars. 
 There is some reason to believe that these cross section estimates may be biased.  
If there are differences in populations across states that influence how much homework 
students do, these characteristics could end up being correlated with the parameters of 
interest.  To address geographic selection that is based on student and family 
characteristics, I include a series of covariates that are important determinants of student 
homework time, including the amount of homework that was assigned by the students 
teachers, the student’s locus of control, the average of the student’s peers’ test scores,  
parent’s education, parent’s income, and whether the household owns more than 50 
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books.  The inclusion of these variables has some impact on the estimates, most notably 
the impact of the education-intensity of industry and the unemployment rate.  
It is also possible that the parameters of interest are correlated with other 
unobserved permanent state-wide characteristics of the population.  One way to control 
for this unobserved state heterogeneity is to include state level fixed effects in the 
specification.  This is done in column 3.43  In this specification the impact of college 
tuition becomes trivial.  The impact of the having more education intensive industry 
growth increases by about a third, and the impact of increasing the minimum wage 
increases by about 8%.  The impact of the unemployment rate changes dramatically.  
These estimates indicate that students consistently decrease the amount of homework that 
they complete as the unemployment rate increases, with diminishing effect at higher 
unemployment rates.  A change in the unemployment rate from 5 to 6 percent is 
estimated to decrease the amount of homework students do by about 19 minutes per 
week.44  
It is also possible, however that some sort of geographic selection based on 
unobserved individual or family characteristics is driving these results.  The student and 
family covariates may not capture this selection sufficiently, but any permanent 
heterogeneity should be captured by individual fixed effects.  Column 4 shows a 
specification with student fixed effects, but no state fixed effects. 45  These results are 
very similar to the specification with state fixed effects.  The only exception is the impact  
                                                 
43 In specification 3, the state effects are jointly statistically different from zero at the 1% confidence level. 
 
44 These results are similar when compared to a specification that uses the natural log of homework as a 
dependent variable.  See appendix D for a comparison. 
45 The family characteristics are not time-variant in this data, and thus it is not possible to include them in 
the individual fixed effects specifications. 
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Table 5: The response of students' homework time to labor market conditions by sex, income and 
achievement. 
Population Women Men 
High 
Income 
Low 
Income 
High 
Achievement 
Low 
Achievement 
-0.109 -0.078 -0.086 -0.090 -0.251 0.055 Public four year college 
tuition (in thousands) (0.276) (0.259) (0.258) (0.279) (0.266) (0.268) 
2.373 -0.017 1.757 0.396 0.753 1.034 
Industry Education Score 
(1.029) (1.031) (1.038) (1.024) (1.053) (1.001) 
-0.752 -1.001 -0.842 -1.011 -1.059 -0.919 Unemployment rate:  
4.8 to 5.5 percent (0.258) (0.257) (0.254) (0.264) (0.261) (0.254) 
-1.011 -1.149 -1.094 -1.115 -1.331 -1.022 Unemployment rate: 
5.5 to 6.3 percent (0.248) (0.251) (0.251) (0.250) (0.262) (0.237) 
-1.122 -1.534 -1.197 -1.508 -1.206 -1.616 Unemployment rate: 
6.3 to 7.5 percent (0.315) (0.315) (0.310) (0.324) (0.318) (0.311) 
-1.567 -1.438 -1.452 -1.615 -1.605 -1.695 Unemployment rate: 
above 7.5 percent (0.371) (0.375) (0.368) (0.382) (0.381) (0.364) 
0.578 0.229 0.281 0.527 0.104 0.629 
Minimum Wage 
(0.240) (0.248) (0.243) (0.246) (0.248) (0.239) 
Observations 18696 18002 17697 19001 17119 19579 
The dependent variable in each specification is the number of hours of homework completed per week.  
The full sample, split approximately in half for each pair of specifications includes 31334 observations.  
Each specification also includes the amount of homework assigned, the student's locus of control, an 
average of peers' test scores, and wave indicator variables.  The excluded unemployment rate category 
is from 2.4 to 4.8 percent.  All monetary values are in 2007 dollars.  The income specifications are split 
based on annual family income in 8th grade.  The achievement specifications are split based on 8th 
grade achievement exams in four core subjects. 
 
of college tuition, which has a larger impact, but is still not significantly different from 
zero.46 
As with student’s dropout decisions, it is likely that students’ responses vary by sex, 
family income, and achievement.  In Table 5 the student fixed-effects specification is 
estimated separately by these variables.  The differences between the responses of men 
and women are similar to those shown in Table 3.  Women respond more strongly to 
changes in the education-intensity of industry and changes in the minimum wage.  In fact, 
                                                 
 
46 For full results for specification 4, see appendix B.  These results are robust to changes in the 
specification.  Neither adding interaction terms or relaxing the linear specification changes the qualitative 
results.  Also, in a specification that includes both state and individual fixed effects, the state fixed effects 
are not jointly statistically different from zero.  
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men respond half as strongly to changes in the minimum wage, and show no response to 
changes in the education intensity of industry.  Conversely, young men have a slightly 
stronger response to changes in the unemployment rate. 
Contrary to the results in Table 3, it is high income students who show a stronger 
response to changes in the education intensity of industries.  In keeping with earlier 
results however, low income students have a much stronger response to changes in the 
unemployment rate and the minimum wage.  Low achieving students have a stronger 
response to changes in the education-intensity of industries than high achieving students, 
and a response to the minimum wage that is six times greater in magnitude.  Their 
responses to changes in the unemployment rate however, are similar. 
The direction of the impacts for homework time is consistent with the impacts of 
the same variables on the probability of dropping out of school.  A more education 
intensive industry mix encourages more investment in human capital both in terms of 
enrollment and homework, especially among women.  A higher unemployment rate, 
where it is estimated to have an effect, consistently induces young people to invest less in 
human capital.  The industry education score is a likely indicator of higher returns to 
education, and should signal to young people that investments in education will be 
rewarded in the labor market.  Conversely, a higher unemployment rate diminishes 
expected labor market returns at all levels, thus diminishing the value of human capital 
investment.    
According to Leighton and Mincer’s (1981) framework, the minimum wage has 
effects both on labor supply and labor demand.  The positive correlations found here 
between the minimum wage and students’ human capital investments is consistent with a 
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higher youth unemployment rate, and with firms substituting high-skill workers for low-
skill workers in response to a minimum wage increase.  Or, in similar fashion, firms my 
decrease the amount of training that they provide, inducing workers to pursue more 
training through schooling and homework. 
As stated earlier, there is evidence that investment in homework pays off in the 
long run, compared to years of schooling, which are rewarded in the labor market more 
immediately.47  This payoff timeframe is consistent with the observed impacts of the 
unemployment rate.  If students take the unemployment rate to be a signal of future 
employment prospects, and this effect dominates the short-run trade-off between labor 
market participation and human capital investment, then there will be, as observed, an 
inverse relationship between the unemployment rate and human capital investment. 
 
Conclusions 
 Given concerns about academic achievement in U.S. secondary education, there 
are obvious reasons to increase time spent on homework (McMullen 2008) and lower 
dropout rates among high school students.  These estimates provide evidence that a wider 
range of determinants may be important for understanding student achievement.  In 
particular, students’ human capital investment while in high school is influenced by 
education and labor market incentives.    
An implication of these findings is that shifts in the labor market toward more 
education-intensive jobs seem to increase students’ investment in human capital, through 
both enrollment and homework time.  Conversely, high unemployment rates decrease the 
amount of homework students do.  These relationships hold up both in cross sectional 
                                                 
47 See Farber and Gibbons (1996), Murnane, Willett, and Levy (1995), and Bishop (1992). 
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and panel data analysis, indicating that they are not driven by geographic selection or 
unobserved state characteristics.  These indicate that some of the geographic variation in 
achievement outcomes are likely due to these labor market factors, and not directly 
attributable to school or teacher characteristics.   
  Finally, students have real responses to the supply-side impacts of changes in the 
minimum wage.  Women, low income students, and low achieving students especially 
increase their human capital investment when faced with a higher minimum wage.  This 
finding runs counter to some of the literature on the minimum wage and dropout rates.  
The effect is appears both in student’s enrollment and homework choices, and occurs 
most strongly in the groups that are more likely to be impacted by the minimum wage. 
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
 
Mathematics Test Scores: The cognitive tests were given to students with each survey, 
and varied according to students’ past performance.  For this reason, raw scores are not 
used, but instead the scores are normalized across waves, and I divided the variables by 
10 within each year so that the standard deviation is approximately equal to 1.  The tests 
were created to allow comparison across grades, and to accurately measure student 
achievement even if students do not complete the entire exam. 
 
Hours of Mathematics Homework:  This variable measures the number of hours that the 
student spends per week on mathematics homework.  The NELS data records the hours 
of homework completed in a series of categories.  Each student is assigned the mean 
value for their category.   
 
Hours of Homework:  This variable measures the number of hours that the student spends 
per week on homework in all subjects.  The NELS data records the hours of homework 
completed in a series of categories.  Each student is assigned the mean value for their 
category.   
 
Class Size: This is defined as the average size of the observed classes taken by the 
student in each wave. 
 
Teacher Has Certification in Field: This variable equals 1 if all of the teachers surveyed 
for this student have the certification to teach the class that the student is taking.  It equals 
0.5 if one teacher is certified and the other is not, and it equals 0 if all of the teachers 
surveyed are not certified. 
 
Inexperienced Teacher: This indicator variable is equal to one if the teacher interviewed 
has three or less years of experience.  The source variables did not allow for separate 
indicators for one, two, and three years of experience. 
 
Minimum Teachers’ Wage: This variable comes from the school counselors’ survey, and 
records the minimum annual wage for a teacher in the school that the student is attending.  
This variable is adjusted so that it is measured in units of $1000 inflation-adjusted 2005 
dollars. 
 
Assigned Homework:  This is a continuous variable recording the average hours per week 
that the students’ interviewed teachers assigned.  The source variables were all 
continuous, though the base year was a weekly variable and the second and third waves 
asked for daily amounts.  I multiplied the daily homework amounts by 5 to get the 
weekly amount. 
 
Locus of Control: This is a composite of three questions, which measures the degree to 
which the student has an “internal” locus of control.  Students with an internal locus 
believe that their actions and choices can shape their future, where students with an 
external locus believe external events will be the primary determinants of what their 
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future is like.  A higher number indicates that the students’ locus is more internal.  The 
questions ask the student to agree or disagree (five point scale) with the following 
statements: 
 “In my life, good luck is more important than hard work for success.” 
 “Every time I try to get ahead, something or somebody stops me.” 
 “My plans hardly ever work out, so planning only makes me unhappy.” 
 
Minimum Wage: The highest legally binding minimum wage for the student’s state of 
residence, either the statewide or federal minimum.  This variable is adjusted for inflation 
to 2005 dollars. 
 
Unemployment Rate: The 2 year average of the monthly unemployment rate for the 
students’ state of residence. 
 
Industry Mix: An industry-education index.  This variable takes the nation-wide average 
education level for employees in a given industry based on the 1990 IPUMS CPS march 
supplement.  The index is a sum of this statistic for each industry in the state, weighted 
by the number of people in the state that are employed in that industry. 
 
Parents’ Income: Annual family income recorded in 1988.  The variable is recorded in 14 
categories.  The value of this variable is the average of the category range, those in the 
top category were assigned 1.5 times the top value. 
 
Parents’ Education: The average years of schooling of the student’s parents. 
 
Family owns more than 50 books: A dichotomous variable indicating whether or not the 
student’s family owns more than 50 books. 
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Appendix B: Selected Full Regression Results 
 
Table B1: Full Regression Output for the Main Results – Chapter 2 
 1 2 3 
Dependent Variable: Hours of Homework Math Test Scores Math Test Scores 
 0.243  Hours of Mathematics Homework per 
Week  (0.086)  
0.065  0.009 
Hours of Assigned Homework per Week 
(0.026)  (0.003) 
0.127   
Locus of Control 
(0.075)   
-0.062 0.004 -0.012 
Class Size (in units of 10 students) 
(0.040) (0.012) (0.006) 
-0.032 -0.001 -0.020 
Teachers are Certified in Subject Matter 
(0.144) (0.037) (0.021) 
-0.496 0.106 -0.015 
Inexperienced Teachers 
(0.154) (0.058) (0.023) 
-0.011 0.004 0.002 
Minimum Annual Teacher Wage 
(0.010) (0.003) (0.001) 
0.001 0.001 0.001 
Average Peers' Test Score 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
0.117 -0.029 -0.002 
Average Peers' HW Time 
(0.018) (0.011) (0.002) 
-0.996 0.262  
State Unemployment Rate 
(0.197) (0.100)  
0.063 -0.017  
State Unemployment Rate Squared 
(0.014) (0.007)  
0.285 -0.104  
Minimum Wage 
(0.234) (0.065)  
0.229 -0.089  
Industry Mix 
(0.525) (0.136)  
0.091 -0.022  
State Public four year tuition 
(0.210) (0.210)  
-0.499 0.206  
State Financial Aid Per Student 
(0.508) (0.137)  
-0.082 0.016  State Higher Ed. Appropriations Per 
Student (0.078) (0.021)  
3.599 -0.351 0.521 
Wave 2 Indicator 
(0.114) (0.316) (0.011) 
3.325 0.165 0.972 
Wave 3 Indicator 
(0.299) (0.300) (0.023) 
  3.997 
Constant 
  (0.085) 
No. of Observations 17610 17610 9776 
No. of Students 7902 7902 4990 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  Column 1 shows the full first stage results from Table 3 column 7.  
The column 2 shows the second stage results from Table 2 column 7, and the last column shows the results 
from equation 12.  All equations include student fixed effects.  The homework used in column two is the value 
of homework time predicted by the specification in column one. 
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Table B2: Full results for selected specifications – Chapter 3 
Specification Table 2: Col. 3 Table 4: Col. 5 
-0.0009 -0.0782 Public four year college tuition 
(in thousands) (0.0010) (0.2016) 
-0.0121 1.0984 
Industry Education Score 
(0.0044) (0.7431) 
-0.0018 -0.8846 Unemployment rate:  
4.8 to 5.5 percent (0.0042) (0.1832) 
-0.0030 -1.0799 Unemployment rate: 
5.5 to 6.3 percent (0.0023) (0.1783) 
-0.0013 -1.3164 Unemployment rate: 
6.3 to 7.5 percent (0.0027) (0.2256) 
-0.0026 -1.4926 Unemployment rate: 
above 7.5 percent (0.0033) (0.2692) 
-0.0047 0.4248 
Minimum Wage 
(0.0023) (0.1734) 
-0.0020  
Female 
(0.0011)  
-0.0052  
Black 
(0.0017)  
-0.0002  
Hispanic 
(0.0022)  
-0.0097  
Asian/Pacific Island 
(0.0019)  
0.0166  
American Indian 
(0.0044)  
0.0099  
Other Race 
(0.0083)  
-0.0098  
Parents' Education 
(0.0011)  
-0.0085  
Parents' Log Income 
(0.0008)  
-0.0068  
Family Owns >50 Books 
(0.0019)  
 0.1736 
Hours of Homework Assigned 
 (0.0333) 
 0.0368 
Average of Peers' Test Scores 
 (0.0126) 
 0.3635 
Locus of Control 
 (0.1003) 
 1.5591 
Wave 2 Indicator 
 (0.1275) 
0.0089 7.3914 
Wave 3 Indicator 
(0.0024) (0.1921) 
Column one is estimated as a probit, and has a sample size of 40443.  
Column two is estimated using OLS, includes student and state fixed 
effects, and has a sample size of 31334 observations. 
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Appendix C: Policy Comparison 
 
Results shown in Table 7. 
Assigning Additional Homework:  
Average Annual Teacher Salary for 2005: $47,602 (American Federation of 
Teachers 2007)  Hourly wage: $47,602 a year / 40 weeks per year / 40 hours per week = 
$29.75 per hour. 
I assume that 1 hour of assigned homework takes the teacher 1 hour to prepare 
and record.  So a one hour increase in homework per week would cost the teacher $29.75 
per week for 40 weeks, totaling $1190.   
Among students for whom a mathematics instructor is surveyed, when the first 
stage equation from Table 3 column 5 is estimated, the coefficient on the hours of 
homework assigned variable is 0.103.  This indicates that students complete an additional 
0.103 hours of homework per hour assigned.  The value of students’ time has two 
components, first, the wages they could earn, for which I use the 1990 average hourly 
wage for 16 to 18 year olds, which in 2005 dollars is $5.63 per hour48.  Additionally, the 
opportunity cost for the students includes the value of work experience.  To estimate the 
present discounted value over the student’s lifetime of an hour of work experience, I 
estimated the following wage equation using the 1990 5% census sample: 
 1 2 3 4Log i i i i iW Educ Exp Xα α α α ε= + + + +  
 
Where Wi is the hourly wage, Educi is a vector of education attainment indicator 
variables, Expi is a vector of 25 experience indicators variables, defined as age - years of 
                                                 
48 This is very close to the federally mandated minimum wage for 1990, which in 2005 dollars is $5.68 per 
hour.  Teenagers could be lawfully paid less than the minimum wage in some circumstances. 
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school – 6, and Xi is a vector of sex and race indicator variables.  The 3α  coefficients are 
used to create a wage profile for a person with a high school education over a 50 year 
working career, assuming that they start with the average wage cited above, $5.63 per 
hour.  The profile of a similar person with one less experience step is subtracted from this 
profile, to find the wage profile difference due to an additional year of experience at the 
beginning of their career.  Finally, this schedule of wage differences is discounted using a 
5% interest rate, and divided by a 50 week year, 40 hour a week working schedule to find 
the value of an hour of experience.  This amount, in 2005 dollars is $4.74.  The total 
hourly opportunity cost for a student is therefore $10.37.  Assuming the class includes 25 
students, the student cost of an additional hour of assigned homework for one week is 
$26.70.  Over 40 weeks, the total cost to students is $1068.11. 
Thus the total social cost of assigning one additional hour of homework per year 
is $2258.  A $10,000 investment in additional assigned homework could “buy” 4.43 
hours of homework per year.  This homework investment, multiplied by the homework 
coefficient from equation 12 is 4.43*.016 which is a 0.07 standard deviation increase.  
This would result in a class wide increase in math achievement of 2.7 percentile points. 
 
Increasing Class Size 
The average class size observed in the NELS data is 25 students.  The cost of 
decreasing a class by one student is therefore roughly 1/25th of the cost of a teacher’s 
annual salary.  So $47,602/25 = $1904 is the relevant cost.  This understates the cost if 
there are space constraints, and the schools need to find additional classroom space or 
build new schools. 
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A $10,000 investment in class size reduction per classroom would thus be enough 
to reduce classes by 5.25 students.  This reduction, according to the impact estimated in 
equation 12, would increase students’ mathematics achievement by 0.006 standard 
deviations.  This corresponds to a change of 0.24 percentile points.  This impact is 
overestimated, however, if lower quality teachers are hired in order to reduce class size. 
 
Increasing Teachers’ Wages 
The only teachers’ pay measure available in the NELS data across all three waves 
is the minimum full time teacher’s wage.  Since most teachers get paid according to a 
district-wide scale that depends on education and experience, the minimum wage is 
probably a good measure of the impact of wages, since it will not be confounded with the 
impact of teachers’ education or years of experience. 
The impact associated with increasing a teachers’ wage by $10,000 is ten times 
the impact shown in equation 12, which amounts to 0.02 standard deviations.  This effect 
would increase the mathematics achievement by 0.8 percentile points. 
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Table D1: Comparison with Value-Added Specification 
Estimation Method OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 
0.009 0.007 0.006 0.244 
Hours of Math Homework per Week 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.087) 
-0.010 -0.008 -0.011 0.004 
Class Size (in units of 10 students) 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.012) 
0.035 0.020 -0.012 -0.002 
Certified Teacher 
(0.057) (0.058) (0.014) (0.037) 
-0.041 -0.027 -0.011 0.108 
Inexperienced Teacher 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.015) (0.059) 
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.005 
Minimum Annual Teacher Pay (in thousands) 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
0.903    
Lagged Mathematics Test Score 
(0.006)    
Student Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes 
The total number of observations for each specification is 17610.  Each specification also includes 
peers' test scores, peers' homework time, labor market conditions, and wave indicators.  The 
dependent variable for columns 1,3, and 4 is the student’s mathematics test score, for column 2 it is 
the difference between the current test score and that of the previous period. 
 
 
Appendix D: Alternate Specifications 
  
The “value added specification” has become a standard in the education 
production function literature, due largely to the prevalence of data which does not allow 
more detailed specifications of the production function.  In the context of this paper, a 
value added specification would be the following: 
0 1 2 3 4 5 1it it it it it it i itAT H S T X ATα α α α α α λ ε−= + + + + + + +  
The only difference between this specification and the one in equation 7 is the addition of 
the achievement test score from the previous period to the right hand side of the equation.  
This lagged test score is meant to control for all time-invariant unobserved student 
characteristics ( iλ ), and thus produce a less-biased estimate of the parameters of interest.  
Another common method for estimating a value added specification is to use the 
difference in test scores between two periods as the dependent variable, while using non-
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differenced independent variables.  For a broader discussion of the merits of this 
approach see Todd and Wolpin (2003). 
 It is likely that the value added specification will produce estimates that suffer 
from the same biases as the fixed effects specifications, which also control for time-
invariant student characteristics, but do nothing to eliminate bias due to measurement 
error or time varying education shocks.  Moreover, since the lagged test score on the right 
hand side is an endogenous variable, the presence of this control may bias the estimates 
of the other parameters. 
Table D1 shows the results of three specifications similar to that of Table 2 
column 6.  The first column is a valued-added specification, estimated with OLS, the 
second column shows the same specification, only instead of a lagged test score, this 
specification includes student fixed effects.  Finally, column three includes student fixed 
effects and is estimated using two stage least squares.  The value-added specifications in 
the first and second columns produce results that are of similar magnitude to the fixed 
effects specification, and with similar precision.  The results are much smaller than those 
produced with the fixed effects-IV estimation strategy used in this study.  Using the value 
added approach to investigate the impact of homework on academic achievement would 
result in estimates that are much lower than the true value. 
 Somewhat in the spirit of the value added specification, it is also worth 
considering specifications which include inputs from previous periods, but not the lagged 
test score.  The justification for this specification is that the current test score is a product 
of multiple years of inputs, and the fixed effects will eliminate the influence of inputs 
prior to the first period, but inputs from the previous period might still be relevant.     
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Table D2: Alternate Specifications 
 1 2 
0.192 -0.038 
Hours of Math Homework per Week 
(0.124) (0.043) 
0.136  Hours of Math Homework Per Week in 
Previous Period (0.089)  
-0.010  
Hours of Math Homework per Week Squared 
(0.006)  
-0.005  Hours of Math Homework Per Week in 
Previous Period Squared (0.005)  
 0.148 
Hours of Math Homework per Week in Wave 2 
 (0.031) 
 0.181 
Hours of Math Homework per Week in Wave 3 
 (0.035) 
-0.001 0.000 
Class Size (in units of 10 students) 
(0.001) (0.001) 
0.002  
Class Size in Previous Period 
(0.003)  
0.099 0.021 
Certified Teacher 
(0.151) (0.022) 
-0.032  
Certified Teacher in Previous Period 
(0.043)  
0.055 0.038 
Inexperienced Teacher 
(0.050) (0.027) 
0.121  
Inexperienced Teacher in Previous Period 
(0.107)  
0.005 0.003 
Minimum Annual Teacher Pay (in thousands) 
(0.003) (0.001) 
0.004   Minimum Annual Teacher Pay in Previous 
Period (0.004)   
Observations 3612 17610 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses.  The dependent variable for each 
regression is the mathematics achievement test score.  All regressions 
include wave indicators, peer characteristics, student fixed effects, labor 
market conditions and higher education conditions.  In column one, the 
excluded instruments are the amount of homework assigned, the locus of 
control, each of these squared, and lagged values of these four instruments.  
In the second column, the excluded instruments are the locus of control 
and the amount of homework assigned interacted with wave indicators. 
 
Column 1 in Table D2 shows the results of a specification in which the contemporaneous 
and lagged values of each input into the education production function are included.  The 
value of inputs two periods back can not be included in a specification that includes fixed 
effects.  The cost of adding in these other inputs is that the sample is limited to only 3612  
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students, since this specification requires three observations on each student.  Because of 
the smaller sample, the estimates are somewhat less precise. 
 This specification does show that past inputs do affect current performance.  The 
lagged homework variable, which is estimated using two stage least squares, is estimated 
to have 7/10ths the effect of contemporaneous homework.  None of the estimates in this 
specification, however, are statistically different from zero. 
 It is also worth considering different effects by grade.  The specification estimated 
in column 2 of Table D2 estimates three homework effects, one for each year in the 
sample.  This specification produces similar results to those in column 1.  This 
specification indicates that in high school homework has a much stronger effect than in 
8th grade.  This specification has some advantages over the one used in the Table 2, 
except that the instruments are not as powerful in 8th grade as they are in 10th and 12th 
grades, so the 8th grade estimate is less trustworthy. 
 
Chapter 3 
As an additional specification test, Table D3 compares two sets of results for the 
homework model.   Column 1 shows the results from Table 4 column 4, which uses 
weekly homework as the dependent variable and column 2 uses the natural log of weekly 
homework as a dependent variable.  Column 3 displays the marginal effects from the 
specification in column two, using homework hours as the units, so that they can be 
compared to the results from column 1.  The marginal effects were calculated using the 
smearing factor as outlined in Naihua Duan (1983) and Norton (2006): assuming non-  
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Table D3: Specification Comparison For Homework Model 
  1 2 3 
-0.086 0.017 0.115 Public four year college tuition (in 
thousands) (0.189) (0.021)  
1.096 0.040 0.268 
Industry Education Score 
(0.728) (0.083)  
-0.892 -0.130 -0.884 Unemployment rate:  
4.8 to 5.5 percent (0.182) (0.021)  
-1.089 -0.136 -0.924 Unemployment rate: 
5.5 to 6.3 percent (0.176) (0.020)  
-1.334 -0.159 -1.083 Unemployment rate: 
6.3 to 7.5 percent (0.223) (0.025)  
-1.512 -0.181 -1.231 Unemployment rate: 
above 7.5 percent (0.264) (0.030)  
0.405 0.074 0.504 
Minimum Wage 
(0.173) (0.004)   
Column 1 shows the results using hours of homework per week as the 
dependent variable.  Column 2 shows results when the log of homework hours 
is used as the dependent variable, column three displays the estimates from 
column 2 shown as marginal effects in homework hours, comparable to 
column 1. 
 
normal homoskedastic errors, the estimated marginal impact of a change in an 
independent variable x is equal to 
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 The effects of industry score and public college tuition differ between 
specifications, though the differences are not statistically significant.  The impact of the 
unemployment rate, while slightly smaller with the log specification, is similar.  The 
impact of the minimum wage is close between the two specifications, with slightly higher 
results in the log specification. 
  Table D4 shows the results for a specification that includes another 
potentially important dependent variable in the dropout model: the high skill-low skill log 
wage differential.49  If this wave difference is large, students would be expected to drop  
                                                 
49 This variable was created using the 1988, 1990 and 1992 March CPS data.  The average log wage is 
calculated for high and low skill groups, based on education, where high skilled 
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Table D4: Dropout Model Extensions 
  1 2 
-0.0002 0.0030 Public four year college 
tuition (in thousands) (0.0013) (0.0055) 
-0.0310 -0.0003 
Industry Education Score 
(0.0070) (0.0163) 
-0.0043 -0.0028 Unemployment rate:  
4.8 to 5.5 percent (0.0057) (0.0047) 
-0.0046 -0.0101 Unemployment rate: 
5.5 to 6.3 percent (0.0035) (0.0034) 
-0.0048 -0.0104 Unemployment rate: 
6.3 to 7.5 percent (0.0040) (0.0042) 
-0.0066 -0.0045 Unemployment rate: 
above 7.5 percent (0.0041) (0.0049) 
-0.0068 0.0037 
Minimum Wage 
(0.0030) (0.0032) 
-0.0159  High skill - Low skill Log 
Wage Difference (0.0137)  
State Fixed Effects   X 
Observations 40433 40433 
Discrete time hazard model, estimated as a probit, with standard errors (in 
parentheses) clustered at the state level.  A time period is two years.  The 
unemployment rate is the two year monthly average over the current and 
previous year, the excluded unemployment rate category is from 2.4 to 4.8 
percent.  Other variables are lagged one period.  The total number of 
observations is 40443.  Marginal effects are reported.  All specifications 
include a wave three intercept.  Individual characteristics include sex, race, 
and locus of control.  Family characteristics include parents education, 
income, and whether the family owns more than 50 books.  All monetary 
values are in 2007 dollars. 
 
out of high school less often.  Column one shows the primary dropout specification with 
this variable included, and the parameter estimate indicates that this effect is negative, as 
hypothesized, but the parameter estimate can not be distinguished from zero. 
 The second column in Table D4 includes state fixed effects into the main dropout 
specification.  There is some danger in this method since some states have less than 100 
observations, and with small cell sizes, the probit estimates are inconsistent with fixed 
effects.  Even with the lost degrees of freedom, the unemployment rate still has a 
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negative effect in the low to middle ranges.  The other labor market variables’ estimates 
can not be distinguished either from zero or the estimates presented in Table 2. 
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Appendix E: Sensitivity of Results 
 In order to further test the sensitivity of the results reported in chapter 2, Table E1 
shows, in columns 1 and 2, two specifications that test the validity of the instruments. 
Each specification includes one of the two instruments in the second stage equation, 
using the other instrument to identify the impact of homework.  In each case, the included 
instrument does not have a statistically significant impact on students’ achievement.  This 
provides additional evidence that the two instruments are correctly excluded from the 
second stage equation, and provide exogenous variation in homework time. 
 
Table E1: Education Production Function Estimation Results 
 1 2 3 
0.299 0.221 0.240 
Hours of Math Homework per Week 
(0.182) (0.096) (0.107) 
0.001 0.000 0.000 
Class Size (in units of 10 students) 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
0.005 0.002 0.005 
Certified Teacher 
(0.045) (0.034) (0.041) 
0.129 0.089 0.101 
Inexperienced Teacher 
(0.102) (0.061) (0.064) 
0.005 0.005 0.006 Minimum Annual Teacher Pay (in 
thousands) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) 
 0.010  
Locus of Control  (0.022)  
-0.005   
Hours of Homework Assigned (0.014)     
Obs 17610 17610 14610 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses.  The dependent variable for 
each regression is the mathematics achievement test score.  All 
regressions include wave indicators, peer characteristics, student fixed 
effects, labor market conditions and higher education conditions.  
Column 3 does not include the students only observed in waves 1 and 
3. 
 
 The third column tests an alternate sample of the NELS data.  There 3000 
students who are only included in the main sample in waves 1 and 3.  Because the gap 
between observations is longer for these students, it is worth testing to make sure that 
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excluding them from the sample does not change the results.  The results are very similar 
to those displayed in Table 2, indicating that this sample change is not an important one. 
 Though almost all studies of homework effectiveness focus on mathematics 
homework and achievement, it is worth considering whether these results are applicable 
to other subjects.  Table E2 shows the results of the primary specification (Table 2 
column 7) reported homework amounts and test scores from four different subjects for 
comparison.  Unfortunately, the instrumental variable strategy is not effective for these 
other subjects.  The two instruments, while strong predictors of the amount of  
 
Table E2: Impact of homework by subject 
  
  
Impact of an hour of 
homework (SE) 
F-Statistic for Test of 
instruments (P-Value) 
0.243 4.460 
Mathematics 
(0.086) (0.012) 
0.757 0.600 
English 
(0.697) (0.547) 
0.000 0.900 
History 
(0.121) (0.408) 
0.117 2.240 
Science 
(0.092) (0.106) 
Each cell in column one is from a separate regression, with specifications 
that differ only by the subject matter in the test (dependent variable) and 
homework completed (independent variable).  Each was estimated using 
instrumental variables, where the excluded instruments were the locus of 
control and the amount of homework assigned.  The second column shows 
the f-statistic and p-value for a joint test of the significance of the excluded 
instruments in the first stage equation. 
 
mathematics homework that students complete, are much less powerful predictors of 
homework completed in other subjects.  To show this, I display in column two the F-
statistic and p-value on the f-test of the joint significance of the excluded instruments.  
Only for mathematics homework can null hypothesis (that the instruments are not jointly 
equal to zero) be rejected at a 5% confidence level.  For this reason, a different estimation 
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approach will have to be used to do a good comparison of the impact of different types of 
homework. 
Because there are a number of students in the data that report doing zero hours of 
homework, there is some worry that the linear specifications presented in this paper will 
not be able to account for the behavior of students in this group.  This is the case 
especially if there is a much higher return to doing the first hour of homework than 
subsequent hours, a problem which is partially addressed by the quadratic specification 
employed in table 5.  The problems associated with left-censored data are not likely to 
apply to this study however, since only 4.3% of the students in the sample reported doing 
zero hours of homework.  Nevertheless, Table E shows the results from four 
specifications which test the importance of this feature of the data.  The first two 
specifications include student fixed effects, and are estimated using OLS. 
Table E3: Left Censored Data Tests 
Estimation Method OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 
0.006 0.005 0.244 0.212 
Hours of Math Homework per Week 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.087) (0.104) 
 0.078  1.270 Homework indicator (zero if 
homework=0, 1 if homework>0)  (0.018)  (1.897) 
-0.011 -0.011 0.004 0.002 
Class Size (in units of 10 students) 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.012) (0.012) 
-0.012 -0.012 -0.002 0.000 
Certified Teacher 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.037) (0.036) 
-0.011 -0.010 0.108 0.104 
Inexperienced Teacher 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.059) (0.061) 
0.002 0.002 0.005 0.005 Minimum Annual Teacher Pay (in 
thousands) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) 
The total number of observations for each specification is 17610.  Each specification 
also includes student fixed effects, peers' test scores, peers' homework time, labor 
market conditions, and wave indicators. 
 
The only difference between the specifications is that the second specification includes a 
homework indicator variable, which equals 1 if a student does any mathematics 
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homework, and zero otherwise.  The third and fourth specifications are estimated using 
two stage least squares, and the fourth specification also includes the homework indicator 
variable.  In both pairs of regressions, the specification that includes the indicator 
variable has a slightly lower marginal impact of an additional hour of homework.  The 
difference, however, is slight.  So while the indicator variable does have a large estimated 
impact, the marginal effects of doing an hour of homework seem robust to these other 
specifications. 
 
Appendix F: Sample Attrition 
 The full sample of students surveyed in the NELS is much larger than the sample 
used in this study.  Because of the estimation strategy used in this paper, a student can 
only be included if there are at least two periods in which all of the necessary variables 
are observed.  Students are dropped for many reasons: the NELS sampled out 6000 
students after the first wave, some students dropped out of school, and most importantly, 
many students or teachers did not provide answers for all of the questions.  To expore 
whether or not sample attrition is a problem, Table F1 compares the summary statistics of 
students in the first wave for four samples: the full NELS sample, the sample of students 
who were not sampled out after the first wave, the sample of students who are questioned 
in the second wave, and the sample used in this study.  While many of the differences are 
not striking, for most of the variables the difference between the variable means from the 
full sample and the study sample are statistically different at the 5% level.  Most notably, 
the locus of control and achievement test scores show large differences between samples.  
The difference between the second and third samples indicate that non-random attrition  
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due to dropouts and students leaving the sample seems to cause some of the difference, 
while the difference between columns 3 and 4 indicate that non-random survey non-
response causes some large differences as well.  Overall the sample used for the study 
does seem to be different than the original NELS sample, which raises the possibility that 
the results are biased and/or not representative.  That said, the inclusion of student fixed 
effects in the mains specifications may ameliorate this problem somewhat. 
Tables F2 and F3 compare the summary statistics from the samples used in the 
third chapter to comparable summary statistics from the unrestricted NELS sample.  In 
 
Table F1: Summary Statistics - Sample Comparison 
 
Full NELS 
Sample 
Sample w/o students 
randomly dropped 
Continuing 
Sample Study Sample 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Hours of Math Homework per Week 1.419 1.700 1.436 1.720 1.503 1.755 1.463 1.676 
Assigned Homework per Week 2.267 1.057 2.234 1.029 2.257 1.014 2.235 0.952 
Mathematics Test Score 4.462 0.887 4.507 0.887 4.628 0.862 4.676 0.832 
Class Size (in units of 10 students) 23.659 5.874 23.797 5.570 23.830 5.535 24.058 5.120 
Teachers are Certified in Subject 0.809 0.372 0.816 0.366 0.817 0.365 0.817 0.366 
Inexperienced Teachers 0.107 0.238 0.105 0.233 0.102 0.229 0.098 0.216 
Minimum Annual Teacher Wage 28.953 6.273 29.205 5.919 29.055 5.979 28.484 5.178 
Locus of Control 0.003 0.620 0.015 0.615 0.065 0.596 0.094 0.579 
Average Peers' Test Score 52.753 6.033 52.924 5.862 53.486 5.840 53.373 5.175 
Average Peers' HW Time 5.410 1.943 5.350 1.902 5.464 1.948 5.433 1.718 
State Unemployment Rate 5.595 1.556 5.626 1.544 5.580 1.519 5.701 1.539 
Minimum Wage 3.373 0.099 3.371 0.090 3.372 0.089 3.366 0.071 
Industry Mix 8.070 0.163 8.065 0.162 8.069 0.162 8.051 0.163 
State Public four year tuition 1.567 0.502 1.569 0.510 1.582 0.512 1.614 0.533 
State Financial Aid Per Student 0.368 0.315 0.360 0.305 0.365 0.307 0.330 0.268 
State Higher Ed. Appropriations Per 
Student 6.919 2.074 6.854 2.044 6.851 2.045 6.395 1.877 
Number of Students 20660 to 26820 15696 to 20764 13150 to 17135 7450 
This Data is from the National Education Longitudinal Study of 1988.  All four samples examine only the 
statistics of students in the 8th grade (wave 1).  All monetary variables are measured in thousands of dollars, 
and inflation adjusted to 2005 dollars.  The continueing sample includes only students who are surveyed in the 
second wave.  The second sample eliminates only those that were randomly dropped by the NELS study after 
the first wave. 
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Table F2: Summary statistics for hazard model sub sample and full NELS sample. 
  Sub Sample Full NELS Sample 
  Mean SD Mean SD 
Dropped Out of School50 0.035 0.183 0.049 0.216 
Unemployment Rate (2-year ave.) 6.231 1.588 6.244 1.583 
Minimum Wage (1990 dollars) 5.774 0.409 5.771 0.419 
Industry Education Score 8.082 0.173 8.082 0.169 
Public 4-year tuition (in 1000's of 2007 dollars) 2.882 0.983 2.842 0.970 
Female 0.506 0.500 0.498 0.500 
Black 0.115 0.318 0.132 0.338 
Hispanic 0.115 0.320 0.143 0.350 
Asian/Pacific Islander 0.061 0.239 0.071 0.256 
American Indian 0.029 0.168 0.033 0.179 
Race Missing 0.009 0.096 0.012 0.107 
Parents' Education 3.156 1.259 3.110 1.292 
Parents' Income 10.865 0.951 10.832 0.969 
Family has more than 50 books 0.900 0.300 0.891 0.311 
 
Table F2 the second and third waves of data are included, for Table F3, all three 
waves.  Again, the differences between the full sample and the sample used in this study 
are significant for some important variables, such as the dropout rate and locus of control. 
 Finally, to illustrate where observations were lost, Table F4 shows the cumulative 
drops for different categories of variables for both samples used in the third chapter.  The 
largest number of dropped variables is the results of students who did not answer many or 
most of the questions in the main survey.  There were also many observations for which 
the teacher or parent surveys were not completed. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
50 The mean of this variable is not the same as the dropout rate for this sample, since this sample combines 
students from multiple waves.  The cumulative dropout rate for the restricted sample is 7%, compared to 
about 9.7% in the unrestricted sample. 
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Table F3: Summary statistics for homework sub sample and full NELS sample 
 Sub Sample Full NELS sample 
  Mean SD Mean SD 
Hours spent on homework per week 8.115 7.221 8.260 7.499 
Unemployment Rate (2-year ave.) 6.017 1.662 6.076 1.658 
Minimum Wage (1990 dollars) 5.878 0.389 5.913 0.409 
Industry Education Score 8.079 0.170 8.080 0.167 
Public 4-year tuition (in 1000's of 2007 dollars) 3.007 1.054 3.015 1.059 
Parents' Education 3.230 1.258 3.139 1.286 
Parents' Income 10.926 0.918 10.864 0.947 
Family has more than 50 books 0.911 0.284 0.899 0.302 
Average of peers' test scores 54.334 6.946 53.891 7.295 
Average hours of homework assigned 2.675 1.492 2.674 1.505 
Locus of Control 0.051 0.618 0.017 0.632 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table F4: Observations Dropped from Full NELS Sample 
  Dropout Sample Homework Sample 
Full NELS hazard model sample 52832 82182 
Race and Sex  48133 55349 
Parents Characteristics 40443 46027 
Peer characteristics  42826 
Teacher Survey   36698 
Cell entries represent number of observations left when the different groups of 
variables are added to the analysis.  The final sample for each part of the 
analysis is the bottom number in each column. 
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Appendix G: Model Implications 
 As described in the paper, in the following three-period model students face a 
standard tradeoff between consumption and leisure, choosing how many hours to work in 
each period, how much time to spend doing homework in the first period, whether to 
drop out of high school, and whether to attend college.  In the first period, students’ 
utility U1 depends on their choice of the number of hours to work (h1) and the amount of 
time to spend on homework (HW).   
   ( )1 1 1,L hsU u y w h T HW h t= + − − −  
Here T is the student’s endowment of time, wL is the wage earned by workers without a 
high school degree, and ths is the amount of time devoted to attending high school.  In 
each period, there is some probability, determined by the period specific unemployment 
rate tµ , that work will not materialize, and the student will be constrained to zero hours 
of work for that period, yielding a utility in which consumption is determined by y, the 
student’s consumption endowment. 
Students observe employment opportunities before deciding whether to drop out 
of high school, still a student could drop out of high school even if employment in period 
one is not an option.  If the student chooses to drop out of high school, their first period 
utility is as follows: 
    ( )1 1 1,LU u y w h T h= + −  
 Students discount future utility at a rate β .  In the second period, if the student 
chose to complete high school, the student can now choose either to attend college, or to 
enter the labor market full time.  If college is chosen the student’s second period utility is 
as follows: 
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   ( ) ( )( )2 2 2,hs collegeU u y w HW h C HW T h t= + − − −  
Where with probability 2µ  the student’s hours of work are constrained to zero.  
Consumption in college is dependent on the cost of college, C, which is a function of how 
much homework the student completed in high school.  Additionally, the wage of 
students who finish high school is also a function of their high school homework time.  If 
instead the student chooses to enter the labor market, their utility is: 
   ( )( )2 2 2,hsU u y w HW h T h= + −  
As before, with probability 2µ  the student’s hours of work are constrained to zero. 
 In the third period students enter the labor market full time.  Those who finish 
college now earn a wage equal to wc, also a function of the amount of homework the 
student completed, whereas students who did not attend college still earn a the wage whs.  
Their third period utility functions differ only by the wage and their chosen hours of 
work.  In each case, the probability that h3 is constrained to equal zero is 3µ . 
    
( )( )
( )( )
3 3 3
3 3 3
,
,
c
hs
U u y w HW h T h
U u y w HW h T h
= + −
= + −
 
 Because a student’s employment status in period one is known before they choose 
whether or not to drop out of school, if the student is unemployed in the first period, h1 
will equal zero.  This yields the following objective function: 
• If the student chooses not to drop out of school, and to go to college: 
( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )
1 1
2 2 2 2
2 2
3 3 3 3
,
      (1 ) , ,
      (1 ) , ,
L hs
hs college college
c
U u y w h T HW h t
u y w HW h C HW T h t u y C HW T t
u y w HW h T h u y T
β µ βµ
β µ β µ
= + − − − +
− + − − − + − − +
− + − +
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• If the student finishes high school and does not finish college: 
 
( )
( )( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )
1 1
2 2 2 2
2 2
3 3 3 3
,
      (1 ) , ,
      (1 ) , ,
L hs
hs
hs
U u y w h T HW h t
u y w HW h T h u y T
u y w HW h T h u y T
β µ βµ
β µ β µ
= + − − − +
− + − + +
− + − +
 
• If the student drops out of high school: 
 
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1
2 2 2 2
2 2
3 3 3 3
,
      (1 ) , ,
      (1 ) , ,
L
L
L
U u y w h T h
u y w h T h u y T
u y w h T h u y T
β µ βµ
β µ β µ
= + − +
− + − + +
− + − +
 
 
The impact of an increase in the unemployment rate on the probability of dropping out of 
school: 
 First, I assume that future unemployment rates are strictly increasing functions of 
the current unemployment rate, to capture the effect that changes in the current 
unemployment rate has on student’s expectations of future unemployment rates.  Second, 
let the functions Vdo and Vhs be value functions, defined as: 
(1) * * * *1 2 3( , , , , )eV U h h h HW ψ=  
where U is the objective function of the student, * * * *1 2 3, , ,  and h h h HW  are the values of the 
choice variables that maximize the students expected discounted utility U, and ψ  is the 
set of exogenous parameters, including wL, whs, and tµ .  Here, e is the student’s chosen 
education track, either drop out (do) or high school (hs), and the value functions represent 
the total utility that the student will receive in each education track.  Using the envelope 
theorem to simplify the comparison, if 
1 1
do hsdV dV
d dµ µ>  then an increase in the unemployment 
rate will increase the probability of dropping out, since the total utility expected if the 
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student drops out will be decrease less than their expected utility if in high school.  The 
comparison is thus between: 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2 1 2 2
1
2
3 1 3 3
' ( ) , ,
           ' ( ) , ,
do
L
L
dV
u y w h T h u y T
d
u y w h T h u y T
βµ µ
µ
β µ µ
 = − + − + + 
 − + − + 
 
 and: 
( )( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )
2 1 2 2
1
2
3 1 3 3
' ( ) , ,
           ' ( ) , ,
hs
hs
hs
dV
u y w HW h T h u y T
d
u y w HW h T h u y T
βµ µ
µ
β µ µ
 = − + − + + 
 − + − + 
 
1
dodV
dµ
 will always be larger than 
1
hsdV
dµ
 because high school graduates’ wages are assumed 
to be strictly greater than the wages of dropouts. 
 
The impact of an increase in the unemployment rate on the optimal amount of homework 
completed: 
To examine this effect, I start by looking at the case of the student who is not 
pursuing college.  I assume all first derivatives are positive, second derivatives are 
negative, and cross partials are positive.  Using the implicit function theorem and 
Cramer’s rule,  
 1 1 2 2 3 3
1
h h h h h h HWHWU U U UdHW
d Hµ
=
i i i
 
where H is the four by four matrix of second derivatives of the function U.  This quantity 
can only be signed if we make the assumption that the labor supply curve is non-
backward bending, or that the income effect that results from a decrease in the 
unemployment rate (increased future expected income) is not larger than the substitution 
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effect (more homework today and less leisure because of the higher payoff for homework 
due to lower unemployment probability).  Under this condition, the second derivatives 
Uh2HW  and Uh3HW are strictly positive, and then 
1
dHW
dµ
 is negative. 
 This result also holds for students who choose to attend college.  The only 
difference in this case is that homework also affects the price of college, but if doing 
more homework has decreases the price of a college education (because of merit aid, 
scholarships, or simply because the work is easier) then this only increases the delayed 
payoff for homework, leaving the effect of the unemployment rate on the optimal amount 
of homework time negative. 
 
The impact of an increase in the cost of college education on human capital investment: 
 In an argument virtually identical to the one above, an increase in the cost of 
college education is a negative future income shock, similar to an increase in 
unemployment.  Thus, under the condition stipulated above, this will cause students to 
complete less homework.  An increase in the cost of college also has an unambiguous 
positive effect on the probability of dropping out of school in this model. 
 
A note on the unemployment rates: 
 A more realistic model would include multiple unemployment rates in each 
period, which would depend on the person’s level of education.  This simpler model is 
used in the paper because the use of multiple unemployment rates created a significant 
colinearity problem in the empirical work, and thus only a single unemployment rate was 
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used.  Thus in order to create predictions from the model that were applicable to the 
empirical work, a single unemployment rate is preferable.   
 It is worth noting, however, that since the second and third period unemployment 
rates are considered to be functions of the first period unemployment rate, it is easy to 
consider the case in which these future unemployment rates are functions of both the first 
period unemployment rate and the chosen education level.  The predictions derived above 
would remain unchanged in that case that the second and third period unemployment rate 
functions ( )( )2 1,eµ µ  are separable in 1µ  and e.  Then the first derivatives of these 
unemployment functions respect to 1µ  would be equal, and the derivations above would 
remain unchanged.  
